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RACOM M!DGE2 Privilege Escalation via SDK Testing Endpoint

High

Synopsis

A non-primary administrator user with admin rights to the web interface but without shell access permissions can display configuration of the device including the master admin password. This vulnerability also allows the user to give themselves shell access with the root gid.

 

Despite the tester user being assigned the administrator role, this crosses a security boundary because a regular user with admin privileges still requires the main admin password to make certain actions. It's also possible to impose restrictions on that user (no shell, no access to PHP CLI) and this would bypass those as well.

 

This was tested on RACOM M!DGE2 4.6.40.106

 

Proof of Concept

In the first screenshot we can see there is an it_admin user who has administrator rights but does not have shell access to the device.

 

 User accounts including it_admin which does not have CLI access

 

If we browse to /admin/sdkTesting.php we can see there is a console that allows us to run some code on the device.

SDK testing console which allows us to run code on the device.

 

The below script will dump the main admin’s password.

ADMIN_PWD = nb_config_get("admin.password");

printf(ADMIN_PWD);

 

SDK Testing script to dump the main admin password

Alternatively we can give ourselves shell access with the below script. 

 

nb_config_set("user.0.shell=sh");

 

After running this script in the test console we can go to /admin/userAccounts.php and see that our it_admin user now has shell access to the device.

 

User accounts including it_admin which now has CLI access

 

When we ssh in as that user we can see we have shell access.

CLI showing the it_admin user now has the root GID

Solution

There is currently no fix available.

Disclosure Timeline

April 24, 2025 - Tenable requests security contact.
May 6, 2025 - Tenable sends second request for a security contact.
May 7, 2025 - RACOM responds with contact information.
May 28, 2025 - Tenable sends disclosure email.
June 11, 2025 - RACOM responds indicating they do not believe this to be an issue.
June 27, 2025 - Tenable responds with a video and our reasoning.
July 7, 2025 - Tenable asks for confirmation of receipt of previous message and for status update.
July 8, 2025 - RACOM responds that they have reviewed and decided not to fix the issue.
August 22, 2025 - Tenable reminds RACOM that we intend to publish our findings on August 26.

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Risk Information

CVE ID: CVE-2025-36729
Tenable Advisory ID: TRA-2025-25
Credit:
Derrie Sutton
Giulio Lyons
CVSSv3 Base / Temporal Score:
7.2
CVSSv3 Vector:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Products:
RACOM M!DGE2
Risk Factor:
High

Advisory Timeline

August 26, 2025 - Initial release.