Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized. This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker. Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller` hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item` entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call, the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23` being the first release containing the patch.

The remote Fedora 37 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-788d505ddc advisory.

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

Cacti is an open-source web-based IT monitoring solution written in PHP. Cacti versions before 1.2.23 suffer from an unauthenticated remote code execution when any monitored device is configured with a specific data source. By crafting a specific URL, an attacker could run arbitrary commands on the vulnerable Cacti instance and compromise the application.

A command injection vulnerability exists on the Cacti server that allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability resides in the remote_agent.php file. This file can be accessed without authentication.

The version of cacti installed on the remote host is prior to 1.1.19-2.20. It is, therefore, affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the ALAS-2023-1675 advisory.

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote openSUSE 15 host has packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the openSUSE- SU-2023:0025-1 advisory.

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 36 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-d4085a681f advisory.

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The version of FreeBSD installed on the remote host is prior to tested version. It is, therefore, affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the 59c284f4-8d2e-11ed-9ce0-b42e991fc52e advisory.

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Debian 10 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the dla-3252 advisory.

  - Multiple Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulneratiblities exist in Cacti 1.2.12 in (1) reports_admin.php, (2)     data_queries.php, (3) data_input.php, (4) graph_templates.php, (5) graphs.php, (6) reports_admin.php, and     (7) data_input.php. (CVE-2020-23226)

  - A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in templates_import.php (Cacti 1.2.13) due to Improper     escaping of error message during template import preview in the xml_path field (CVE-2020-25706)

  - graph_realtime.php in Cacti 1.2.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell     metacharacters in a cookie, if a guest user has the graph real-time privilege. (CVE-2020-8813)

  - Under certain ldap conditions, Cacti authentication can be bypassed with certain credential types.
    (CVE-2022-0730)

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Debian 11 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the dsa-5298 advisory.

  - Under certain ldap conditions, Cacti authentication can be bypassed with certain credential types.
    (CVE-2022-0730)

  - Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault     management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an     unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was     selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can     be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via     `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After     this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the     resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized.
    This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The     function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine     the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker.
    Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an     attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way     the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to     `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller`     hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is     bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called     function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item`     entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the     function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is     retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is     later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By     e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call,     the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding     `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can     easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`     action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some     predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection     vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the     `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented     by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP     address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept     for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running     Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23`     being the first release containing the patch. (CVE-2022-46169)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
194644	Fedora 37 : cacti / cacti-spine (2023-788d505ddc)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	critical
113872	Cacti < 1.2.23 Remote Code Execution	Web App Scanning	Component Vulnerability	critical
173897	Cacti 1.2.22 Command Injection (CVE-2022-46169)	Nessus	Web Servers	critical
170545	Amazon Linux AMI : cacti (ALAS-2023-1675)	Nessus	Amazon Linux Local Security Checks	critical
170267	openSUSE 15 Security Update : cacti, cacti-spine (openSUSE-SU-2023:0025-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	critical
170004	Fedora 36 : cacti / cacti-spine (2023-d4085a681f)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	critical
169701	FreeBSD : net-mgmt/cacti is vulnerable to remote command injection (59c284f4-8d2e-11ed-9ce0-b42e991fc52e)	Nessus	FreeBSD Local Security Checks	critical
169445	Debian DLA-3252-1 : cacti - LTS security update	Nessus	Debian Local Security Checks	critical
168615	Debian DSA-5298-1 : cacti - security update	Nessus	Debian Local Security Checks	critical

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2022-46169

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical