Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES15 / SLES_SAP15 / openSUSE 15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2025:03545-1 advisory.

    Note this update contains a already fixed references mostly.

    - Remove git-core recommends on SLE to avoid pulling it in unnecessary. (bsc#1250508)

      This feature is mostly intended for developers ('docker build git://') so       most users already have the dependency installed, and the error when git is       missing is fairly straightforward (so they can easily figure out what they       need to install).

    - Include historical changelog data from before the docker-stable fork. The       initial changelog entry did technically provide all the necessary       information, but our CVE tracking tools do not understand how the package is       forked and so it seems that this package does not include fixes for ~12 years       of updates. So, include a copy of the original package's changelog up until       the fork point. bsc#1250596

    - Update to docker-buildx v0.25.0. Upstream changelog:
      <https://github.com/docker/buildx/releases/tag/v0.25.0>

    - Update to Go 1.23 for building now that upstream has switched their 23.0.x       LTSS to use Go 1.23.

    - Do not try to inject SUSEConnect secrets when in Rootless Docker mode, as       Docker does not have permission to access the host zypper credentials in this       mode (and unprivileged users cannot disable the feature using       /etc/docker/suse-secrets-enable.) bsc#1240150

    - Initial docker-stable fork, forked from Docker 24.0.7-ce release       (packaged on 2024-02-14). The original changelog is included below for       historical reference.

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES12 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2025:03540-1 advisory.

    - Include historical changelog data from before the docker-stable fork. The       initial changelog entry did technically provide all the necessary       information, but our CVE tracking tools do not understand how the package is       forked and so it seems that this package does not include fixes for ~12 years       of updates. So, include a copy of the original package's changelog up until       the fork point. (bsc#1250596)

    - Remove git-core recommends on SLE. Most SLE systems have       installRecommends=yes by default and thus end up installing git with Docker.
      bsc#1250508

      This feature is mostly intended for developers ('docker build git://') so       most users already have the dependency installed, and the error when git is       missing is fairly straightforward (so they can easily figure out what they       need to install).

    - Backport <https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/48517>. bsc#1247362

    - Update to docker-buildx v0.25.0. Upstream changelog:
      <https://github.com/docker/buildx/releases/tag/v0.25.0>

    - Do not try to inject SUSEConnect secrets when in Rootless Docker mode, as       Docker does not have permission to access the host zypper credentials in this       mode (and unprivileged users cannot disable the feature using       /etc/docker/suse-secrets-enable.) bsc#1240150

    - Initial docker-stable fork, forked from Docker 24.0.7-ce release       (packaged on 2024-02-14). The original changelog is included below for       historical reference.

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Ubuntu 18.04 LTS host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the USN-7474-1 advisory.

    Cory Snider discovered that Docker incorrectly handled networking packet encapsulation. An attacker could     use this issue to inject internet packets in established connection, possibly causing a denial of service     or bypassing firewall protections. This issue only affected Ubuntu 22.04 LTS, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS, and Ubuntu     18.04 LTS. (CVE-2023-28840, CVE-2023-28841, CVE-2023-28842)

    Rory McNamara discovered that Docker incorrectly handled cache in the BuildKit toolkit. An attacker could     possibly use this issue to expose sensitive information. (CVE-2024-23651)

    It was discovered that Docker incorrectly handled parallel operations in some circumstances, which could     possibly lead to undefined behavior. (CVE-2024-36621, CVE-2024-36623)

    Rory McNamara discovered that Docker incorrectly verified file paths during a certain command in the     BuildKit toolkit. An attacker could possibly use this issue to delete arbitrary files from the system.
    (CVE-2024-23652)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Ubuntu security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
    Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
    (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
    compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
    simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
    supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
    virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
    an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
    the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the
    overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful
    when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by
    encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in
    Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional
    properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and
    confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby
    installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These
    rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a
    VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without
    interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter
    incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted
    datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been
    previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby
    sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should
    have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A
    sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound
    gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond
    simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases
    23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of
    that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,
    UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or
    ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

The remote host is affected by the vulnerability described in GLSA-202409-29 (Docker: Multiple Vulnerabilities)

    Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Docker. Please review the CVE identifiers referenced     below for details.

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Gentoo Linux security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

According to the versions of the docker-engine packages installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerabilities :

    Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the containers     outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations     beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby     releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently,     users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by     default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet     injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm     cluster.(CVE-2023-28840)

    Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm     cluster.(CVE-2023-28841)

    Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node.
    For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by     IPSec.(CVE-2023-28842)

    Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder     cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some     instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with     the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially     crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are     only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are     using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API     endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the     uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases.(CVE-2024-24557)

    Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and     other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many     networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently     referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus     behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_.
    The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and     other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are     created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for     non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an     internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any     networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set     up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately     configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In     addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking,     `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a     resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS     request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the     configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of     access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a     consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve     names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver.
    Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems     run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a     consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's     configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap,     and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a     loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework     namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as     expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container     network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS     requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative     nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in     DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as     Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and     23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run     containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will     force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.(CVE-2024-29018)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the EulerOS docker-engine security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

According to the versions of the docker-engine packages installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerabilities :

  - A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient     to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. (CVE-2022-41723)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a     single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

  - A malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive     server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the     http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create     a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound     the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit     (MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client     has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows     too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2     for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per     HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the     Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function. (CVE-2023-39325)

  - Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder     cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some     instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with     the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially     crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are     only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are     using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API     endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the     uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases. (CVE-2024-24557)

Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the EulerOS security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.

According to the versions of the docker-engine package installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerabilities :

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a     single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the EulerOS security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.

The remote Fedora 39 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-b9c1d0e4c5 advisory.

    - Update moby-engine to 24.0.5
    - Security fix for CVE-2021-41803
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28842
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28841
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28840
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-0845
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-26054
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-3064
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-40716
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-25173


Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

There are packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities referenced in the following CVEs:

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
    Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
    (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
    compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
    simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
    supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
    virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
    an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
    the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the
    overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful
    when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by
    encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in
    Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional
    properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and
    confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby
    installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These
    rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a
    VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without
    interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter
    incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted
    datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been
    previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby
    sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should
    have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A
    sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound
    gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond
    simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases
    23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of
    that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,
    UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or
    ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
    Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
    (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
    compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
    simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
    supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
    virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
    an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
    the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating
    overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted
    mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec
    Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted
    overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data
    integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an
    encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both
    incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`
    kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced
    on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An
    iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay
    network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit
    unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as
    expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for
    an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is
    moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because
    many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may
    use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is
    no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container
    Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some
    workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the
    Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,
    and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,
    Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component
    (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is
    compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a
    simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and
    supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated
    virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is
    an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag
    the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating
    overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted
    mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec
    Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted
    overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data
    integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an
    encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both
    incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`
    kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced
    on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The
    `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each
    node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for
    destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay
    networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to
    communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the
    VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into
    the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be
    quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available
    in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered
    differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-
    node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a
    single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same
    connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented
    using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode
    (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay
    networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

The remote SUSE Linux SLES15 / SLES_SAP15 / openSUSE 15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2023:3536-1 advisory.

    - Update to Docker 24.0.5-ce.

      See upstream changelong online at       <https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2405> bsc#1213229

    - Update to Docker 24.0.4-ce.

      See upstream changelog online at       <https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2404>. bsc#1213500

    - Update to Docker 24.0.3-ce.

      See upstream changelog online at       <https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2403>. bsc#1213120

    - Recommend docker-rootless-extras instead of Require(ing) it, given       it's an additional functionality and not inherently required for       docker to function.

    - Add docker-rootless-extras subpackage (https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless)

    - Update to Docker 24.0.2-ce. See upstream changelog online at       <https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/24.0/#2402>. bsc#1212368

      * Includes the upstreamed fix for the mount table pollution issue.
        bsc#1210797

    - Add Recommends for docker-buildx, and add /usr/lib/docker/cli-plugins as       being provided by this package.

    - was rebuilt against current GO compiler.

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 37 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-cf3551046d advisory.

    - Update moby-engine to 24.0.5
    - Security fix for CVE-2021-41803
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28842
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28841
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28840
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-0845
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-26054
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-3064
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-40716
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-25173

    ----

    Update moby-engine to 23.0.4

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 38 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-9f5f1ef40a advisory.

    - Update moby-engine to 24.0.5
    - Security fix for CVE-2021-41803
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28842
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28841
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-28840
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-0845
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-26054
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-3064
    - Security fix for CVE-2022-40716
    - Security fix for CVE-2023-25173

    ----

    Update moby-engine to 23.0.4


Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Fedora security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES12 / SLES_SAP12 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2023:3307-1 advisory.

    - Update to v20.10.25-ce
    - CVE-2023-28840: Fixed a bug where an attacker could inject arbitrary Ethernet frames to execute a Denial     of Service attack. (bsc#1214107)
    - CVE-2023-28841: Fixed a bug which allows an attacker to sit in a trusted position on the network and     read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected     secrets or user data disclosure (bsc#1214108)
    - CVE-2023-28842: Fixed a bug which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the     encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. (bsc#1214109)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
270307	SUSE SLES15: docker-stable / docker-stable-bash-completion / etc (SUSE-SU-2025:03545-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	critical
270099	SUSE SLES12 Security Update : docker-stable (SUSE-SU-2025:03540-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	critical
235068	Ubuntu 18.04 LTS : Docker vulnerabilities (USN-7474-1)	Nessus	Ubuntu Local Security Checks	high
225932	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2023-28840	Nessus	Misc.	high
408618	SCA: security update for github.com/docker/docker (GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	high
408618	SCA: security update for github.com/docker/docker (GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	high
207893	GLSA-202409-29 : Docker: Multiple Vulnerabilities	Nessus	Gentoo Local Security Checks	critical
202530	EulerOS 2.0 SP9 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2024-1955)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
202502	EulerOS 2.0 SP9 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2024-1928)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
195282	EulerOS 2.0 SP10 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2024-1585)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
195270	EulerOS 2.0 SP10 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2024-1563)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
188871	EulerOS 2.0 SP11 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2023-2679)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
188692	EulerOS 2.0 SP11 : docker-engine (EulerOS-SA-2023-2637)	Nessus	Huawei Local Security Checks	high
185286	Fedora 39 : moby-engine (2023-b9c1d0e4c5)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	high
404112	Alpine: multiple docker packages: security update to 23.0.3-r0	Tenable Cloud Security	Alpine Linux Local Security Checks	high
404112	Alpine: multiple docker packages: security update to 23.0.3-r0	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	Alpine Linux Local Security Checks	high
404108	Alpine: multiple docker packages: security update to 20.10.24-r0	Tenable Cloud Security	Alpine Linux Local Security Checks	high
404108	Alpine: multiple docker packages: security update to 20.10.24-r0	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	Alpine Linux Local Security Checks	high
180537	SUSE SLES15: docker / docker-bash-completion / docker-fish-completion / etc (SUSE-SU-2023:3536-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
180494	Fedora 37 : moby-engine (2023-cf3551046d)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	high
180265	Fedora 38 : moby-engine (2023-9f5f1ef40a)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	high
179830	SUSE SLES12 Security Update : docker (SUSE-SU-2023:3307-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2023-28840

high

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical

high

high

high

high

critical

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high