The remote CentOS Linux 9 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the kernel-5.14.0-756.el9 build changelog.

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read     when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate     element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing     elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension     element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element.
    _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context     exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a     non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds     read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size     1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element     carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing     ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. (CVE-2026-68402)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length     underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA     length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP     header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on     iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data()     then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where     fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16,     MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below     hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into     siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to     siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a     valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() ->     skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to     size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP     receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg,     sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-     after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace:
    skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock     siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where     the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw     transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this     matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP /     LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 (Marker and ULPDU Length     fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
    (CVE-2026-64102)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP     timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at     rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU:
    0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware     name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P)     retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING:
    drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ...
    WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3:
    kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at     refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition     between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping     to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will     flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() {     spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0     rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } }     spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's     reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to     rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use. (CVE-2026-45910)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency     reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads.
    Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179     free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue     is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window     is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref     count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy
    __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path     of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent     folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can     determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked,     we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this     change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related     issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff     on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the     bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report:
    ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache     folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps     mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called     when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent     access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and     finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio     lock. (CVE-2026-45942)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before     payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least     header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the     attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen -     offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size()     underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) +     RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave     payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating     pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +     RXE_ICRC_SIZE. (CVE-2026-46043)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

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CentOS 9 : kernel-5.14.0-756.el9

critical Nessus Plugin ID 363461

Version 1.3

Version 1.2

Version 1.1

Version 1.3 Oct 26, 2026, 2:57 PM CVSS temporal metrics ("CVSSv2 temporal vector" set to "CVSS2#E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C") CVSS temporal metrics ("CVSSv3 temporal vector" set to "CVSS:3.0/E:P/RL:O/RC:C") Exploit attributes ("Exploit available" set to "True") Exploit attributes ("Exploitability ease" changed from "No known exploits are available" to "Exploits are available") Plugin Feed: 202610261457
Version 1.2 Oct 8, 2026, 7:54 AM CVSSv2 score source (changed from "CVE-2026-68402" to "CVE-2026-64102") CVSSv3 score source (changed from "CVE-2026-64102" to none) Plugin Feed: 202610080754
Version 1.1 Oct 7, 2026, 6:12 AM New Plugin Feed: 202610070612