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Unity Linux 20.1050a / 20.1060a / 20.1070a Security Update: kernel (UTSA-2025-387086)
medium Nessus Plugin ID 267461
Synopsis
The Unity Linux host is missing one or more security updates.Description
The Unity Linux 20 host has a package installed that is affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the UTSA-2025-387086 advisory.In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff()
There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map.
This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below).
Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache().
Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this):
--8<-----
__swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE.
swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0.
So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped().
Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries.
Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry.
Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry.
Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache().
-> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.]
Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache().
-> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE
Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls
__try_to_reclaim_swap().
__try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ...
WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries);
What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()?
--8<-----
Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Unity Linux security advisory.
Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.
Solution
Update the affected kernel package.See Also
http://www.nessus.org/u?0949e5d3
Plugin Details
Severity: Medium
ID: 267461
File Name: unity_linux_UTSA-2025-387086.nasl
Version: 1.2
Type: local
Published: 10/7/2025
Updated: 10/15/2025
Supported Sensors: Nessus
Risk Information
VPR
Risk Factor: Medium
Score: 4.4
CVSS v2
Risk Factor: Medium
Base Score: 4.6
Temporal Score: 3.4
Vector: CVSS2#AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C
CVSS Score Source: CVE-2024-26960
CVSS v3
Risk Factor: Medium
Base Score: 5.5
Temporal Score: 4.8
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Temporal Vector: CVSS:3.0/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
Vulnerability Information
Required KB Items: Host/local_checks_enabled, Host/cpu, Host/UOS-Server/release, Host/UOS-Server/rpm-list
Exploit Ease: No known exploits are available
Patch Publication Date: 7/8/2025
Vulnerability Publication Date: 4/9/2024
Reference Information
CVE: CVE-2024-26960