| CVE-2026-98052 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmasp: clear txcb->last before writing each descriptor bcmasp_xmit() only wrote txcb->last = true for the final fragment of an SKB; non-final fragments left the field untouched. If a descriptor slot was reused while it still held a stale true from a previous SKB (possible when tx_spb_ring_full() underreported fullness), bcmasp_tx_reclaim() would see last == true mid-SKB and call dev_consume_skb_any() prematurely, freeing the sk_buff while its remaining fragments were still in flight. Unconditionally clear txcb->last before the conditional set so every descriptor slot starts from a known false state regardless of what a prior transmission left behind. | high | 2026-10-06 |
| CVE-2026-98051 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmasp: fix tx_spb_ring_full() checking same slot cnt times The loop initialised next_index from intf->tx_spb_index on every iteration, so incr_ring() always produced the same result and only one slot was ever tested. Move the initialisation before the loop so each iteration advances next_index and the function correctly checks that cnt consecutive descriptor slots are available before allowing a new transmission. | medium | 2026-10-06 |
| CVE-2026-98050 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mlxsw: spectrum_ptp: Fix napi_gro_receive() call from GC workqueue context Currently mlxsw_sp1_ptp_ht_gc_collect() is run from the PTP garbage-collection workqueue, rather than the NAPI poll context. For any unmatched PTP entries carrying an SKB, it calls mlxsw_sp1_ptp_unmatched_finish() -> mlxsw_sp1_ptp_packet_finish(). For ingress packets, this calls mlxsw_sp_rx_listener_no_mark_func(). The end of that function is the following: skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev); napi_gro_receive(mlxsw_skb_cb(skb)->rx_md_info.napi, skb); The napi pointer is one that was placed in the SKB control block when the trapped packet was received in the NAPI context. Later, when the GC reaps the unmatched entry (up to MLXSW_SP1_PTP_HT_GC_TIMEOUT later), the call to napi_gro_receive() mutates the NAPI instance's GRO list, which is unsafe if the poll is running concurrently on another CPU. In mlxsw_sp1_ptp_ht_gc_collect(), local_bh_disable() is called to prevent softirq processing, but this only applies to the local CPU. Additionally, its comment is stale. It states that mlxsw_sp1_ptp_unmatched_finish() invokes netif_receive_skb(). This has not been accurate since the referenced commit; this patch makes that comment accurate again. mlxsw_pci_napi_devs_init() calls netif_threaded_enable() on the NAPI RX net_device without any conditions. The NAPI instance's poll, which may be running concurrent to the GC, is running as an independently-scheduled kthread which may be on a different CPU. The call to local_bh_disable() does not guard against this. If a tx-timestamp timeout produces an unmatched entry (which can be easily reproduced by running ptp4l and waiting for a port to reach the UNCALIBRATED/SLAVE state) while the owning NAPI thread is in the middle of a poll on another CPU, both sides mutate the GRO list concurrently, as shown below: [39.846] port 1 (swp1): MASTER to UNCALIBRATED on RS_SLAVE list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff8d620faf4138), but was ffff8d624150f700. (next=ffff8d620faf4138). kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 539 Comm: napi/mlxsw_rx-0 Not tainted 6.18.48 #1-NixOS PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2410/VMOD0001, BIOS 4.6.5 09/13/2018 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x79/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffffcdf8c0f27c08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000075 RBX: ffff8d624150fd00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8d6315d1e540 RBP: ffff8d620faf4070 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff R10: ffffffffa5c60fe0 R11: ffffcdf8c0f27ab8 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 000000000000003d R14: 00000000000001bc R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d636f63f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562689a60c24 CR3: 000000015f224004 CR4: 00000000001726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> gro_receive_skb+0xee/0x230 mlxsw_sp1_ptp_got_packet+0x61/0x140 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_core_skb_receive+0xdf/0x1b0 [mlxsw_core] mlxsw_pci_napi_poll_cq_rx+0x780/0x9d0 [mlxsw_pci] __napi_poll+0x31/0x1e0 napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x16b/0x1c0 napi_threaded_poll+0x71/0xa0 kthread+0xfb/0x260 ret_from_fork+0x22d/0x260 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The machinery that leads to this kernel panic has not been changed between 6.18.48 and mainline. This patch adds an ingress-delivery helper for the PTP packet_finish() path that calls netif_receive_skb() instead of napi_gro_receive(). netif_receive_skb(), unlike napi_gro_receive(), can be called from outside of the NAPI instance's poll context, which can occur at the call site for this path. RX stats accounting and the skb->dev assignment are still preserved; the only change is the delivery call itself. This removes GR ---truncated--- | high | 2026-10-06 |
| CVE-2026-98049 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: zero extend the result of an arena 32-bit cmpxchg bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites an atomic on an arena pointer from BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC to BPF_STX | BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC, and it runs before bpf_opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(). That pass emits an explicit zero extension for a 32-bit cmpxchg even when bpf_jit_needs_zext() is false. This is done because on some architectures 32-bit cmpxchg requires explicit zero extension for the dst register. E.g. on x86-64 'lock cmpxchg' does not change the %eax if comparison is successful, while BPF semantics declare that each operation on a 32-bit register zero extends it's upper half. is_cmpxchg_insn() matches BPF_MODE == BPF_ATOMIC only, so an arena cmpxchg misses said zero extension adjustment. This patch adjusts is_cmpxchg_insn() to match BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC alongside BPF_ATOMIC. | medium | 2026-10-06 |
| CVE-2026-98048 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: don't rewrite bpf_fastcall patterns entered by a jump mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() must ensure that matched "spill; call; fill" instruction series is not interrupted by a jump. Otherwise the rewrite applied by bpf_remove_fastcall_spills_fills() is not sound. Record the instructions targeted by jumps in insn_aux_data[*].jump_target when the CFG is built and use this flag to stop growing a pattern at such an instruction. Jumps to the first spill are fine. Note that existing insn_aux_data[*].jmp_point field can't be reused, as it marks subprogram return instructions. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98047 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Check ancestor frames for rbtree callbacks bpf_rbtree_add() invokes its comparator while the caller holds the root lock. The native insertion code retains raw parent and link pointers across the callback, so the verifier prohibits unlocking, consuming tree nodes, or changing RCU state from that callback. in_rbtree_lock_required_cb() only checks the innermost verifier frame. Static subprogram calls are permitted while holding a spin lock, and such a call pushes a frame without in_callback_fn set. Consequently, all callback restrictions disappear in the nested frame. The subprogram can unlock the tree, remove and drop the node being compared, then relock. Native insertion resumes with the stale parent pointer and links freed memory into the tree. Walk all active frames for the rbtree callback instead. Benign static subprograms remain permitted, while callback restrictions follow execution into nested frames. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98046 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind() as sleepable When bpf_btf_find_by_name_kind() finds a type in module BTF, it returns a new BTF object fd through __btf_new_fd(). This reaches anon_inode_getfd(), which can sleep while allocating or expanding the current task fd table. The helper prototype does not set might_sleep, so the verifier allows the helper in non-sleepable contexts such as BPF timer callbacks. The fd allocation can then sleep in softirq context and install the fd into the interrupted task. Mark the helper as sleepable. This preserves calls from the main body of a sleepable syscall program while rejecting calls from its non-sleepable regions. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98045 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark faultable stack helpers as sleepable The faultable variants of bpf_get_stack() and bpf_get_task_stack() pass may_fault=true into the common stack collection code. Resolving user-space build IDs may then call build_id_parse_file() and block on filesystem reads. Neither helper prototype sets might_sleep. Since prototype selection uses the sleepability of the whole program, the verifier can still allow these helpers from a non-sleepable region within that program, such as an explicit RCU or preemption-disabled region. The task-stack helper can also be called from a non-sleepable timer callback of a sleepable program. Mark both faultable prototypes as sleepable. The existing helper context check then rejects these calls while continuing to allow them in genuinely sleepable contexts. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98044 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject legacy packet loads from callbacks check_ld_abs() models a failed BPF_LD_ABS or BPF_LD_IND in a subprogram as an implicit return with R0 set to zero. It calls prepare_func_exit() to explore this synthesized path. When the load is reached directly from a synchronous callback, prepare_func_exit() enforces the callback return contract and marks R0 precise. R0 is not derived from a real instruction on this path, so precision backtracking reaches the callback call with R0 still requested and triggers the "callback unexpected regs" verifier bug. A privileged program loader can therefore cause a verifier warning and an -EFAULT BPF_PROG_LOAD. These legacy packet-load instructions are deprecated. Reject them from callbacks rather than complicating their implicit-return model. Check all active frames before constructing the implicit return so nested static subprograms cannot hide the callback context. Global functions are verified independently with a fresh frame zero, so an active-frame check cannot identify a global function called from a callback. Also check the complete subprogram call graph during stack-depth validation and reject a function containing a legacy load when any caller is a callback. This covers global and static descendants without making has_ld_abs transitive, preserving its per-function BTF return-type check. Ordinary uses outside callbacks remain supported. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98043 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Don't infer non-NULL from a pointer with an unbounded offset reg_not_null() decides that a register holds a non-NULL value by looking at its type alone. For pointer types that allow arithmetic the type only guarantees a non-NULL base, in case of an unbound offset the runtime offset value might still add up to NULL. Consider the followng program: r6 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &0); /* present */ if (r6 == 0) return 0; r7 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &1); /* absent, NULL at runtime */ r8 = r7; r8 -= r6; /* pointer - pointer: unknown scalar, -r6 */ r8 <<= 1; r8 >>= 1; /* any non-negative offset is accepted by */ /* check_reg_sane_offset_ptr() */ r6 += r8; /* verifier: map value; runtime: zero */ if (r7 != r6) return 0; *(u8 *)(r7 + 0); /* r7 is inferred non-NULL, both are zero */ At runtime both registers are zero, the comparison is true and the load faults with NULL pointer dereference. Require the offset to be within +-BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF in reg_not_null(). | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98042 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Don't resurrect a scalar id dropped by collect_linked_regs() check_cond_jmp_op() copies the compared registers into env->{false,true}_reg{1,2} before collect_linked_regs() runs and copies those snapshots back into both branch states afterwards. collect_linked_regs() records at most LINKED_REGS_MAX members of a linked registers group in the jump history and calls clear_scalar_id() for every member that does not fit. The compared register is not exempt from that. As a consequence, sync_linked_regs() might adjust ranges for more registers than bpf_bt_sync_linked_regs() can propagate precision to. Collect the linked registers before the snapshots are taken instead. This might lead to some unnecessary clear_scalar_id's, but from previous testing situations with many linked registers are extremely rare. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98041 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Don't predict JMP32 pointer vs zero comparisons Consider the following program: r1 = map_value; /* low 32 bits are zero at runtime */ r6 = 0xdead000000000000; if w1 != 0 goto l1; l0: r1 += r6; r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); exit; l1: r6 = 0; goto l0; At the moment is_branch_taken() reports the jump as always taken, because it does not distinguish between BPF_JMP and BPF_JMP32 comparisons when processing 'if w1 != 0 ...'. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98040 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark the zero register precise for a register-form NULL check check_cond_jmp_op() accepts "if rA <op> rB" as a NULL check for a nullable pointer rA when rB is a scalar known to be zero, lifts PTR_MAYBE_NULL from rA in the corresponding branch and does not mark rB precise. Consider the following program: r0 = bpf_get_prandom_u32(); r6 = 1; /* the r6 == 0 path is explored first */ if (r0 == 0) goto 1f; r6 = 0; 1: r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &0); /* absent, NULL at runtime */ if (r0 == r6) goto 2f; /* taken as a NULL check for r0 */ *(u8 *)(r0 + 0); /* verifier: map value; runtime: zero */ 2: return 0; The r6 == 0 path is explored first and the dereference is accepted. The r6 == 1 path is pruned at the checkpoint recorded for (1), so the comparison is never verified with a non-zero r6. At runtime a failed lookup returns NULL, NULL != 1 takes the non-NULL edge and the program dereferences a pointer that is zero. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98039 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Require MEM_PERCPU for percpu kptr stores map_kptr_match_type() treats perm_flags as the set of register type flags that a kptr field permits. Adding MEM_PERCPU to that set for BPF_KPTR_PERCPU does not require the source register to carry it, however. The subset test consequently accepts both a plain bpf_obj_new() allocation and a referenced kernel pointer into a __percpu_kptr map field. Loads from the field are always marked MEM_PERCPU. Consumers then treat the stored value as the cookie returned by bpf_percpu_obj_new(): per-CPU pointer helpers relocate it, and map teardown selects the per-CPU free path. A plain allocation can therefore provide an arbitrary kernel read/write, while a kernel pointer can be relocated into an invalid address or sent through a missing destructor. Require the source MEM_PERCPU flag to match the destination field kind. This preserves valid bpf_percpu_obj_new() stores and rejects both the program-BTF and kernel-BTF variants. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98038 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Keep refcount_acquire nullable for borrowed RCU kptrs bpf_refcount_acquire() is fallible for a borrowed reference because the object may have reached a zero refcount. The verifier therefore keeps KF_RET_NULL on the return value unless the argument is an owning reference. An RCU-protected load of a local kptr is marked MEM_ALLOC, but it only receives NON_OWN_REF when the pointee contains a graph node. A refcounted object without a graph node consequently looks like an owning reference even though the loaded register has no acquired reference state. If the program drops the last real reference while remaining in the RCU critical section, refcount_inc_not_zero() returns NULL while the verifier treats the result as non-NULL. Only classify the argument as owning when it is backed by a verifier-tracked reference. This retains the non-NULL return for pointers from bpf_obj_new(), bpf_kptr_xchg(), or an earlier successful acquisition, while requiring a NULL check for borrowed RCU kptrs. [ kkd: Rewrote commit log ] | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98037 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject untrusted allocated-object pointers When the final RCU read-side critical section ends, a local kptr is demoted to PTR_UNTRUSTED but retains MEM_ALLOC. The pointer may be NULL or may refer to an object whose lifetime is no longer protected. type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() nevertheless recognizes any PTR_TO_BTF_ID with MEM_ALLOC as a live allocated object. In particular, a refcount-only local kptr never carries NON_OWN_REF, so it still passes the bpf_refcount_acquire() argument check after RCU protection ends. The kfunc can then dereference NULL or stale memory. Make type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() reject PTR_UNTRUSTED pointers. Since type_is_non_owning_ref() is based on the same predicate, graph kfunc arguments obey the same live-object requirement. Fault-protected reads of the demoted pointer remain valid: writes are already rejected, and read fixups use bpf_may_fault_on_deref() rather than this predicate. [ kkd: Rewrote commit log ] | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98036 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve special fields in recycled rhtab elements rhtab_map_update_elem() initializes special fields after obtaining an element from bpf_mem_cache_alloc(). The allocator can return a fresh, zeroed unit, or recycle one from its RCU-pending lists before the registered destructor has run. A BPF program can retain a map-value pointer after deleting its element and initialize and arm a timer through that pointer. If the deleted unit is recycled, check_and_init_map_value() clears the only pointer to the timer. Neither a later deletion nor rhtab_mem_dtor() can then cancel it, and the callback can run with its key and value pointing into freed memory. Do not reinitialize special fields on insertion. Fresh allocator units are already zeroed. For recycled units, the special fields are ownership state that must remain visible to the eventual destructor. copy_map_value() already skips those fields, matching the non-preallocated hash-map path and the lifecycle established by commit 275c30bcee66 ("bpf: Don't reinit map value in prealloc_lru_pop"). [ kkd: Split out the fix and rewrote the commit log ] | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98035 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Cancel special fields when recycling rhtab elements rhtab_map_update_existing() and rhtab_delete_elem() call bpf_obj_free_fields() when replacing or deleting a value. These map operations can run from BPF programs in NMI context, where releasing a referenced kptr or another complex field is not generally safe. Array and hash maps avoid that problem by cancelling only the asynchronous fields which can be stopped safely in the caller context. Other ownership state remains attached to the allocation until its memory allocator destructor performs the final cleanup. Use bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the corresponding rhtab paths as well. This cancels timers, workqueues, and task work while allowing rhtab_mem_dtor() to release referenced kptrs when the allocation is eventually destroyed. [ kkd: Rebased, used direct helper calls, and rewrote the commit log ] | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98034 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Mark NULL kptr stores precise check_map_kptr_access() permits a scalar store into an untrusted kptr field only when the register is known to contain zero. Unlike other verifier checks whose outcome depends on a scalar value, it does not mark that register precise. A state checkpoint reached with an imprecise zero can therefore prune a second path that reaches the store with an arbitrary nonzero scalar. The program can write attacker-controlled bits into the kptr field and load them back as a PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Call mark_chain_precision() before accepting a known-zero register. This forces state equivalence to compare its scalar range and makes the verifier visit and reject a path carrying a nonzero value. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98033 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve inner map identity in callback frames Callback frame constructors initialize map-typed argument registers with __mark_reg_known_zero() and then restore map_ptr. This clears map_uid, which is the only field distinguishing inner maps that share an inner_map_meta template. When a timer callback invokes bpf_for_each_map_elem() on a second inner map, both the saved first map and the second map value can reach the nested callback as the same template with map_uid zero. bpf_timer_init() then accepts pairing the timer from the second map with the first map. The runtime records the first map in the timer without taking a reference. Freeing that map does not find the timer stored in the second map, so a later timer callback dereferences the freed map. Copy map_uid from the same caller register as map_ptr when constructing for-each, timer/workqueue, and task-work callback arguments. The existing identity check can then reject mismatched inner maps while allowing a callback value to be paired with its actual map. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98032 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix subbuf resize races with trace_pipe_raw readers Concurrent subbuffer resizes may crash trace_pipe_raw readers or leak uninitialized memory to userspace due to stale size values. Modify ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() to handle the resizing of an existing buffer_data_read_page if necessary and add a new ring_buffer_read_page_size(). This new function enables ring-buffer buffer_data_read_page users to not call the racy ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(). This makes the spare_size member of ftrace_buffer_info redundant. Finally, handle buffer_data_read_page/reader_page order discrepancy in ring_buffer_read_page(). On a mismatch simply copy manually the data to the buffer_data_read_page. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98031 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: Initialize extack in remove_nh_grp_entry() remove_nh_grp_entry() prints the extack message when a listener fails to replace the reduced nexthop group. However, extack is not initialized and listeners are not required to set a message when returning an error. Neither netdevsim nor mlxsw do so when an allocation fails, resulting in the dereference of an uninitialized stack pointer. Fix by zero-initializing extack, as was done in commit 6347c5314cee ("nexthop: initialize extack in nh_res_bucket_migrate()"). | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98030 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_get_all() walks the whole cfp.unique bitmap into rule_locs[] without consulting nfc->rule_cnt, which is how many entries the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an admin has installed CFP rules any user can ask for fewer slots than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98029 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: nfp: bound the ntuple rule dump by the caller's buffer size nfp_net_get_fs_loc() dumps every entry of nn->fs.list into rule_locs[] without consulting cmd->rule_cnt, which is how many entries the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an admin has installed flow steering rules any user can ask for fewer slots than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. Bail out with -EMSGSIZE when the buffer fills up, the way the other ntuple capable drivers do, and report how many locations were filled so a shrinking rule list does not leave the caller reading stale slots. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98028 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: nfp: drop the replaced rule from the list when reprogramming fails nfp_net_fs_add() replaces an existing rule by deleting it from the hardware, decrementing nn->fs.count and programming the new one. If nfp_net_fs_add_hw() fails the old entry stays on nn->fs.list - only the success path reaches list_replace() - so the list is one longer than nn->fs.count, and it advertises a rule whose hardware entry has already been torn down. nn->fs.count is what ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLCNT reports, so userspace then sizes its buffer one entry short of what the GRXCLSRLALL walk wants to write. That used to overwrite one u32 past the allocation; since the walk is bounded it is a permanent -EMSGSIZE instead, as nothing ever resyncs the counter. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98027 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bound the policy rule dump by the caller's buffer size mv88e6xxx_get_rxnfc() uses rxnfc->rule_cnt as the write index while dumping the policy IDR, clobbering the input value before it has been looked at. That input is the number of entries the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an admin has installed policy rules any user can ask for fewer slots than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. Count into a local so the caller's limit survives the walk, and stop with -EMSGSIZE once it is reached. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98026 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: properly convert mglist to rcu Sashiko reported a bug [1] that br_multicast_del_port_group unlists the port group not using proper rcu helper that preserves the next pointer and after that immediately frees the port group without waiting for rcu grace period. The only rcu walker of mglist is br_multicast_list_adjacent() and it turns out that function has always been buggy because mglist was never properly converted to RCU. Fix it by converting it to rcu and moving its initialization after eth_addr's. Initializing p->next can use RCU_INIT_POINTER because we have a barrier from the hlist_add_head_rcu call later, besides we're initializing an unpublished structure anyway. [1] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260826014200.362304-1-littleddfu%40gmail.com | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98025 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: cx82310_eth: drop URB after 0xffff reboot sentinel to prevent partial_data heap overflow The 0xffff length sentinel detects a router reboot and schedules re-enabling of ethernet mode, but then falls through to the rest of the loop body. The next check is } else if (len > CX82310_MTU) { which is the else of the just-matched if -- it never fires for len == 0xffff. The MTU bound that normally caps the incomplete-packet save path is silently bypassed. With 0xffff > skb->len always true (rx_urb_size is 4096), the incomplete-packet branch saves dev->partial_len = skb->len bytes into dev->partial_data. partial_data is kmalloc(hard_mtu) = kmalloc(CX82310_MTU + 2) = 1516 bytes, but skb->len after the 2-byte header pull can be up to 4094. A device that sends a 4096-byte URB starting with [0xff 0xff] therefore copies 4094 device-provided bytes into a buffer allocated for 1516 bytes, exceeding its requested size by 2578 bytes. The next URB then reads dev->partial_len (4094) back from the same 1516-byte buffer and dev->partial_rem (65535 - 4094 = 61441) from the new URB's ~4KB skb, both well past their allocations, and delivers the spliced result as a 64KB "frame" to the network stack. Bail out of rx_fixup after scheduling the re-enable work; the remainder of a reboot-marker URB is not meaningful packet data. This restores the invariant that partial_len < CX82310_MTU + 2 on the save path, since every other route there has already passed the MTU check. | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98024 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/ism: folio_put() after error dmb->cpu_addr was allocated via folio_alloc(). Use folio_put() instead of kfree() in the error exit of ism_alloc_dmb() to avoid slab allocator corruption. While at it, reset dmb->cpu_addr after folio_put to avoid unintentional UAF by future callers. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98023 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: reject dynamic fdb entries that reference a nexthop id The commit cited in the Fixes tag allowed VXLAN FDB entries to point to FDB nexthops so that overlay traffic could be load balanced across multiple VTEPs. Such entries can only be configured from user space, cannot be learned and cannot roam. They only make sense with a user space control plane such as E-VPN where data plane learning is disabled. Despite that, the VXLAN driver does not currently prevent such entries from being configured with the "dynamic" flag. The per-nexthop FDB list is only protected by the per-device hash lock, which is not sufficient when two VXLAN devices point to the same FDB nexthop and therefore share the list. Aging runs in softirq context without RTNL, so an entry deleted by one device can race with an addition or deletion from the other, leading to list corruption: list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff8881069d9548, but was dead000000000122. (next=ffff8881069d9448) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 90 at lib/list_debug.c:65 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x210 ... vxlan_fdb_destroy+0x5b8/0xad0 vxlan_cleanup+0x328/0x450 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x1c0 run_timer_softirq+0x18c/0x210 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vxlan_fdb_destroy Fix this by rejecting the bogus configuration of dynamic FDB entries that point to FDB nexthops, both when created and when an existing entry is updated. As such, the per-nexthop FDB list is only ever mutated under the RTNL lock. Add test cases to make sure that this does not regress in the future. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98022 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev->tx_queue_len with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations: - pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len() allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each. - tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier. - tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier. netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN, sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767) there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes effect whether the device is up or down, before dev->tx_queue_len is written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated. The "> S16_MAX" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered by the one comparison. tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb direct_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest value NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN policy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on high-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is disclosed below. Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn). - pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest. - tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to 500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a 512MB guest. - tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest. - On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with -ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively). | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98021 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: reject oversized tx_queue_len at netlink parse time rtnl_create_link() assigns IFLA_TXQLEN directly to dev->tx_queue_len without going through netif_change_tx_queue_len(), so a device created with "ip link add ... txqueuelen 500000" bypasses the S16_MAX cap and still triggers the oversized ring allocations in pfifo_fast, tun and tap. The veth peer nest (rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg()) and the RTM_NEWLINK-on-existing-device path reach the same sinks. Enforce the cap in ifla_policy instead: IFLA_TXQLEN becomes NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(NLA_U32, &txqlen_range) with txqlen_range = { .min = 0, .max = S16_MAX }. All netlink consumers parse against this policy - rtnl_setlink(), rtnl_newlink() (create and change), and the veth peer nest - so every netlink path is capped at parse time and rejects the attribute with -ERANGE plus a proper "integer out of range" extack message before any device state is modified (the RTM_SETLINK half-application wart is gone with it). Document the bound in the rt-link.yaml netlink spec. Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn): ip link add v0 txqueuelen 500000 type veth peer name v1 -> on the fixed kernel this is rejected with -ERANGE ("integer out of range" extack) instead of installing an oversized tx_queue_len that later inflates pfifo_fast/tun/tap ring allocations. - ip link set v0 txqueuelen 500000 is likewise rejected at parse time. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98020 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pds_core: fix cmd_regs access racing BAR unmap on reset pdsc_reset_prepare() and pdsc_reset_done()'s pdsc_map_bars() error path clear/iounmap cmd_regs without devcmd_lock, and pdsc_legacy_firmware_update()'s download loop derefs cmd_regs after dropping and retaking the lock without re-checking. An FLR concurrent with a devlink flash can unmap cmd_regs under an in-flight devcmd, causing a NULL deref or a write to unmapped MMIO. Take devcmd_lock across the BAR unmap/remap, and re-check cmd_regs in the download loop. Only the PF maps cmd_regs and runs devcmd, so skip the unmap on a VF, as pdsc_remove() and pdsc_reset_done() already do. A reset that completes entirely within the unlocked window is not a correctness problem for the image: the device clears its update session, so a resumed download is rejected, and it verifies the staged image before writing a flash slot, reporting PDS_RC_BAD_FW rather than activating it. pdsc_unmap_bars() also clears info_regs, intr_status and intr_ctrl. The interrupt and start/stop readers of those are quiesced before the unmap by pdsc_fw_down(), which frees the interrupts and tears down the queues. The debugfs readers are not, since those files outlive a reset; that is pre-existing and out of scope here. | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98019 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: mark a NULL call argument precise check_func_arg() allows bpf_register_is_null() for nullable arguments w/o marking the underlying scalar register precise. Hence a checkpoint created on such a path would prune against arbitrary scalar value. check_helper_call() enforces second parameter of the bpf_get_local_storage() to be zero, w/o marking the underlying scalar register precise. Hence a checkpoint created on such a path would prune against arbitrary scalar value. Grouping these two into one patch, as they share the same fixes tag. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98018 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mctp: i3c: serialize probe with bus removal mctp_i3c_probe() drops busdevs_lock after finding the matching bus. A concurrent I3C_NOTIFY_BUS_REMOVE can then unregister and free the bus netdev before probe passes its private data to mctp_i3c_add_device(). The latter consequently adds a list node through a freed mbus pointer. Keep busdevs_lock held until the device has been added. This also satisfies the __must_hold annotation on mctp_i3c_add_device(). | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98017 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: defer qdisc freeing after failed creation An RTM_NEWQDISC request can make clsact bind a populated shared ingress block during ->init(), publishing an embedded mini_Qdisc to lockless readers. If the same request has an invalid TCA_RATE, estimator setup fails after ->init(); the unwind removes the pointer but synchronously frees its containing qdisc while tc_run() may still hold it. Retire failed qdiscs through the same RCU helper as normal destruction. Inline the synchronous free into the callback now that no direct callers remain. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98016 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free race in sample_restore_put() Concurrent teardown of TC sample rules sharing the same restore context may re-read restore->count after dropping restore_lock. At that point another thread may already have completed cleanup and freed the restore object. Use the result of the refcount decrement while holding restore_lock to determine whether cleanup is needed. | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98015 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: E-Switch: fix use-after-free in mlx5_eswitch_termtbl_put In mlx5_eswitch_termtbl_put(), the zero-ref cleanup check reads tt->ref_count after termtbl_mutex has been released. Two concurrent callers on the same mlx5_termtbl_handle race: one decrements ref_count to zero, removes the hash entry, and calls kfree(tt) while the other has already dropped the mutex and is about to evaluate if (!tt->ref_count), producing a use-after-free. Fix this by capturing the result of the decrement into a stack-local last variable before dropping the mutex. The cleanup decision is now made entirely under termtbl_mutex, and tt is not touched after kfree. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98014 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: E-Switch, prevent mc_list repopulation during vport disable In mlx5_esw_vport_disable(), move esw_apply_vport_rx_mode() ahead of esw_vport_change_handle_locked() so vport->allmulti_rule is NULL before the change handler observes it. During FW-fatal recovery the disable runs while dev->state == INTERNAL_ERROR. The promisc query inside esw_update_vport_rx_mode() fails and returns early, leaving vport->allmulti_rule intact, so esw_update_vport_mc_promisc() runs and adds MLX5_ACTION_ADD entries to vport->mc_list whose flow rules are then installed in the FDB by esw_add_mc_addr(). esw_destroy_legacy_table() tears down the FDB with those refs still held, corrupting the sub-tree and leaving dangling flow_rule pointers in vport->mc_list. Two-stage failure on `echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/<bdf>/reset`: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. tree_put_node+0xef/0x110 [mlx5_core] clean_tree+0x44/0xd0 [mlx5_core] (x5) mlx5_fs_core_cleanup+0x57/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_unload+0x65/0xd0 [mlx5_core] ... mlx5_health_try_recover BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000003000055 down_write+0x1c/0x60 mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x33/0x1f0 [mlx5_core] esw_del_mc_addr+0x7b/0x170 [mlx5_core] esw_apply_vport_addr_list+0x56/0xf0 [mlx5_core] esw_vport_change_handle_locked+0x28b/0x310 [mlx5_core] mlx5_esw_vport_enable+0x270/0x4a0 [mlx5_core] ... mlx5_load ... mlx5_health_try_recover esw_apply_vport_rx_mode(false, false) clears vport->allmulti_rule via its local state machine even when the FW del fails. With the rule NULL the !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(allmulti_rule) gate in the change handler closes, no rules are installed during disable, and the reload starts with a clean mc_list. | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98013 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_pie: clamp quantum in change path fq_pie_change() accepts any quantum value from userspace, including 1. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service). Add max(256U, ...) matching fq_codel_change(). Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ_PIE=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root fq_pie tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root fq_pie quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98012 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum in change path sfq_change() accepts any non-negative quantum (only rejects (int)ctl->quantum < 0). With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service). Add max(256U, ...) matching fq_codel_change(). Reject quantum > 1<<20 with -EINVAL, matching fq_codel_change() and the init clamp. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_SFQ=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root sfq tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root sfq quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98011 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths hhf_change() accepts any quantum from userspace, including 1. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service). Add max(256U, ...) in hhf_change() matching fq_codel_change(). Clamp hhf_init() to [256, 1<<20] matching the siblings, and remove the old fallback that only set quantum=256 on overflow. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_HHF=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root hhf tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root hhf quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98010 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: drr: clamp quantum in change class drr_change_class() rejects explicit quantum==0 but falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 (or a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device) makes the deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock. Add clamp_t(u32, quantum, 256, 1<<20) after the zero reject and on the fallback path. The explicit-zero reject is preserved. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root drr tc class add dev dummy0 parent 1: classid 1:1 drr quantum 1 | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98009 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: ets: clamp quantum in parse and fallback paths ets_qdisc_change() falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor for bands without an explicit quantum. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device makes the deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock. Move the floor into ets_quantum_parse() so explicitly configured quanta are also clamped to [256, 1<<20], not just the fallback path. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root ets bands 3 strict 2 quanta 1 1 | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98008 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: macb: fix NULL pointer dereference on unbind with fixed-link When the device tree describes a fixed-link and has no "mdio" child node, macb_mii_init() returns early without allocating the MDIO bus, leaving bp->mii_bus as NULL. Two cleanup paths then dereference this NULL bus: 1. On driver unbind, macb_remove() unconditionally calls mdiobus_unregister(bp->mii_bus), which oopses: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000004a8 pc : mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4 lr : macb_remove+0x38/0xa4 Call trace: mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4 (P) macb_remove+0x38/0xa4 platform_remove+0x20/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224 unbind_store+0xb4/0xbc 2. On the probe error path in macb_probe(), reached when macb_mii_init() has succeeded but a subsequent step fails, the err_out_unregister_mdio label runs the same unconditional cleanup. mdiobus_unregister() and mdiobus_free() do not guard against a NULL bus, so guard the calls in both macb_remove() and the probe error path. | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98007 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg() lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks. Since commit bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper bound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts scalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the "backtracking misuse" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently panic. Introduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values and use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then rejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing. | medium | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98006 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: Decoupling ep1_in_urb in caiaq dev The epq_in_urb object belonging to the caiaq device is coupled within the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev. After usb_submit_urb(epq_in_urb, GFP_KERNEL) executes successfully, epq_in_urb is successfully added to the urbp_list queue of the dummy HCD driver (userspace specifies dummy_hcd as the HCD layer driver for the caiaq USB device). When init_card() calls snd_usb_caiaq_send_command() which subsequently fails due to a timeout, and proceeds to call snd_card_free() to release the card, the embedded ep1_in_urb object is also freed. When the dummy HCD driver detects that the URB has been unlinked, it returns the URB (by usb_hcd_giveback_urb()), which triggers [1]. Decouple the ep1_in_urb object from the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev and switch to using a pointer instead. Separately allocate and manage the memory for ep1_in_urb to prevent the release of the snd_card memory object from interfering with it. midi_out_urb has the same issue as ep1_in_urb and is handled in the same way. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88803cee1050 by task ktimers/1/29 Call Trace: usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96 dummy_timer+0xaac/0x4d50 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2019 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2067 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x3eb/0xaf0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2124 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x1e1/0x2e0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2141 Allocated by task 36: snd_card_new+0x7b/0x110 sound/core/init.c:184 create_card sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:429 [inline] snd_probe+0x236/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:544 Freed by task 36: snd_card_free_when_closed sound/core/init.c:630 [inline] snd_card_free+0x138/0x1d0 sound/core/init.c:662 snd_probe+0x162b/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:553 | high | 2026-10-03 |
| CVE-2026-98005 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: delimit inode_share cache key components Previously, inode_share keys were encoded as follows: fingerprint || domain_id It would be better to have a separator between the fingerprint and domain ID so that the fingerprint won't be parsed as part of a domain ID. Change the key encoding as follows: domain_id || '\0' || fingerprint Since domain_id is a NUL-terminated string, this makes the in-memory key indices unambiguous. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98004 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/riscv: Serialize command queue publishing Serialize command queue publishing so software producer state advances only after a command is written and the hardware tail is updated. Wait for hardware consumption outside the queue lock when the command queue is full so other CPUs are not blocked behind a long poll. | high | 2026-09-25 |
| CVE-2026-98003 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Do not reallocate GA log buffers on resume Commit c5e1a1eb9279 ("iommu/amd: Simplify and Consolidate Virtual APIC (AVIC) Enablement") moved the GA log allocation from iommu_init_pci() to enable_iommus_vapic(), which is called on every resume. iommu_init_ga_log() assigns iommu->ga_log and iommu->ga_log_tail unconditionally. Each resume therefore replaces the boot-time pointers and leaks both old allocations. The function also uses GFP_KERNEL from a syscore resume callback, where interrupts are disabled and the non-boot CPUs are offline. Return early if both buffers are already allocated. Clear the pointers in free_ga_log() so a partial allocation failure cannot leave ga_log dangling. | medium | 2026-09-25 |
