In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: mm: validate /dev/mem mmap ranges without overflow An arm64 syzkaller reproducer creates a FUSE character device with major:minor 1:1, so opening it uses the /dev/mem file operations. It maps one page from offset 0xfffffffffffff000 at user address zero. The next openat() with a NULL pathname triggers a synchronous external abort (SEA, ESR 0x96000010) in strncpy_from_user() via do_getname(), panicking the kernel. valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() checks the exclusive end by adding the mapping size to the starting address. For this offset, the sum wraps to zero and passes the PHYS_MASK test, allowing an out-of-range PFN to reach remap_pfn_range(). The inclusive-end overflow check in mmap_mem_prepare() does not catch it because the end is ULONG_MAX. Reject starting PFNs outside PHYS_MASK and compare the inclusive length against the remaining physical range without overflowing. This also allows mappings that end exactly at PHYS_MASK, which the old check incorrectly rejects. [[email protected]: changed the check to look more like __access_ok()]
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fddf55af2d078f4186c5ab4f07383c8599b14640
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db6607fd74263ead8df644b98ff25fac74d86f0e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9a54fc8147f45020badd9001d4ed234c74b9526
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0958b1397fb5ffdb995c0ccc74349841929c08d