In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: clamp the inline data length in ceph_fill_inline_data() The MDS decides how much inline data to attach to a reply, and the client parses inline_len without any upper bound: ceph_decode_need() only verifies that the message actually carries that many bytes. ceph_fill_inline_data() then copies the data into a single folio with no length check, so a malicious or buggy MDS returning more inline data than the folio can hold writes past its end. Clamp the length to folio_size() so both callers, handle_cap_grant() and fill_inode(), are covered.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f07b16256d7041c60dd2e205783d5d3a7934f884
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b325a1f0d441bb1925ef3c1e09d1db05ecfcc12c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d06011f8c5b4c9989397a501483fec0f4a149cb
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c1d14d3b66b3e1dd96ee664c0dd2548f2b77a52