In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as potentially malicious. hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too: the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than the ring. The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices, hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO. One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch: hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is addressed later in the series. Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f204bb7c5d10482067e095af567c391bc88ecb44
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdb9126a79b608b4331dfdc03beb05be8d2563be
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d287c17cc5bfd6386fe0770999be410b248d021
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1611ce4dc6cbace75f27db6a559af8d391a06118