In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: bound da-node entry count against the correct geometry xfs_da3_node_verify() bounds the node entry count against the larger of the directory and attribute geometries because, as a buffer verifier, it cannot tell whether the block belongs to the directory or the attribute tree. When the directory block size exceeds the fs block size (e.g. mkfs.xfs -n size=64k -b size=4k), an attribute node buffer is a single fs block that holds only m_attr_geo->node_ents entries, yet a crafted attr node may claim a count up to m_dir_geo->node_ents and still pass the verifier. xfs_da3_node_lookup_int() then indexes btree[] up to that count during its binary search -- an out-of-bounds read via getxattr/listxattr on a mounted crafted image. The buffer verifier is the wrong place to tighten this: it has no fork context, and the transaction-less read path used by getxattr does not run xfs_da3_node_set_type() either. xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(), on the other hand, always runs on that path and holds args->geo, the geometry of the fork actually being searched. Bound the entry count against args->geo->node_ents there, before walking the entries.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaeb3e51052c94959bbc286ccda0c6f2feb3cd69
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5909f2935ca2897b51800d00f58a48605253ef4b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3df5e5aaa3bc0913236c48ab29b7df3a785aa29f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/229c4478a35663582893916250ebcdfc7b845b85