In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery xlog_recover_inode_commit_pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.: len = item->ri_buf[2].iov_len; memcpy(XFS_DFORK_DPTR(dip), src, len); The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels (CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG off), and xfs_dinode_verify() runs only after the copy. A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds write at mount time. The XFS_ILOG_DBROOT sibling already passes XFS_DFORK_DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths did not. Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the on-disk inode.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2cc5001ffcc1d8e5e16607ce4b6920ea30c2cfe
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2768e65a5f2f942c831e3df3b06ad7332d423e6
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af559d87fdd921b90c86125f78d8b97d754432dd
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9232301894a06e664d8de2da97175cf98419bd16