In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC 15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps. Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider's behaviour is unchanged.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1bf77039cba83373bf1eff3784655e3e3ed2ab
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bb55381daf1a1bed0657189a1396e7467712525
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4117eee82dd85f11bf898bf66026764011eeb6
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/160619b38707241e22569f9c983a4b3d0890996a