In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit() avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache. Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9da796fa238f8e4414ee8481e6c979759a3d563
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e77461af13eab5c9a953cc52ec8432cc941d61e2
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e308c5acfe283a66627fc407065626df4ab753ec
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c781e737aa0de95289b1774d5fd29388895737a9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8861db305103107199b1426f25fde1fb6d465583
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/835133337c2ce200db56f62d018c79087dee2603
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a6f9a872b4ff68877caf998bee352153b7154bc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24e00850bcff46b984f4c44b92e5499450fcfb5a