In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate connectionless PSM length Connectionless L2CAP frames carry a two-byte PSM at the start of the payload. l2cap_recv_frame() currently reads that PSM unconditionally after validating only the outer L2CAP length. A malformed connectionless frame with a zero- or one-byte payload can therefore make the parser read beyond the advertised skb payload and use tailroom bytes as part of the PSM. A VHCI-backed QEMU reproducer injected a one-byte connectionless payload and reached the unchecked read. Reject connectionless frames that cannot contain the PSM before reading or pulling it. This preserves all valid connectionless frames while dropping only structurally incomplete packets.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae69dca122f6d6046a68cf40153e6e827c77ff5c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a40a5f922546b3bd7c094d882b29177db4f2abe0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9448e6f693fcf1f0ac4ee648a9b2cc83bfe4a982
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8104cd9859b6de0826cffa68adf2c1461185823b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72e26293a231f63a856340d3a1f0f5fc29bf87e5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3502ede8aed3c3ee1786d952a11054ac737d1a38
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22fc1ce4e37c81d4e7aac01566ebdc232214540d