In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: validate symlink target length in NFSv4 CREATE nfsd4_decode_create() accepts an unbounded cr_datalen from the wire for NF4LNK symlink targets, allowing a client to force a kmalloc of up to the maximum RPC payload size (several MiB) per COMPOUND op that persists until compound teardown. The VFS rejects oversized targets with ENAMETOOLONG, but the allocation has already occurred. Reject cr_datalen == 0 early with nfserr_inval and cr_datalen greater than NFS4_MAXPATHLEN (PATH_MAX) with nfserr_nametoolong to bound the allocation.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b24843ea3de1676b29902457b38507c95a80649b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/895a485cd3758031ef9993c0d53cf19ce8fb4ccc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45ec115cbfecb4b3cfab7fca6f73d1b60696a25a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041f57056e5fb9c80adc088269322d2c61074406