In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd ("smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()") compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving 'p' pointing into stale data. Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw_len is bounded by the buffer, raw_len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/657372ba6ea50b4474d2a6a610097eae8cd1f3e9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62a3025983c8c735a3c6fc85a59316f31b59af07
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62656b024efc21c3230eade1a847f25871c3d2bb
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f824f61d1df52392eaf0b74dfa5659d724fde30