In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7baf60435129e3a5f3500a38e3cb4c3860deed7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f3a7440731a34c89ad04fef6616f185acb28401
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eb70b78e48b0031bd1a05fe1b58959a48e87739
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/672cf86aa6aa0fb4012ce4c3b3498df42ad67a4e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6343c1da561962688f203362d80d6a3bfa39fa1b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/531ac35abd74fb5b4aec5e19543e832613a1789d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36d01415d881d5326a0dd3384f781cd7e69aff2d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/033bc80019f07d158630df4e69b19a49010f54f1