Capgo (capgo.app) fails to restrict direct write access to the public.sso_providers table exposed through Supabase PostgREST. A holder of an ordinary Capgo full API key can insert a row with status='active' and enforce_sso=true, bypassing the intended backend SSO provisioning route (supabase/functions/_backend/private/sso/providers.ts) and its controls: the Enterprise plan requirement, SSO provider creation via the Supabase Management API, DNS TXT domain-ownership verification, the pending_verification → verified → active status transition, and issuance of a trusted provider ID by Supabase Auth. The forged row is trusted by SSO discovery and enforcement logic, including the unauthenticated login preflight endpoint /private/sso/check-domain, which then reports {"has_sso": true, "enforce_sso": true} for domains that were never verified, allowing attacker-controlled SSO enforcement to be asserted for arbitrary domains and disrupting normal login. All versions are affected; at the time of the advisory no patch was available.
https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-xg7v-83qv-qfff
Published: 2026-09-10
Updated: 2026-09-10
Base Score: 8
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:C/A:P
Severity: High
Base Score: 9.1
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
Severity: Critical
Base Score: 9.3
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Critical
EPSS: 0.00264