In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET `/api/scm/resolve` and `POST /api/factory/resolver` endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to `URLFetcher.fetch()`, which calls `new URL(url).openConnection()` with no scheme or host allow-list and returns the response body to the caller. Any authenticated Che user can read arbitrary local files via the file:// scheme (including the pod's Kubernetes service-account token at `file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), reach internal HTTP services and cloud instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and have their stored SCM personal access token attached as an `Authorization` header to a host of their choosing. The same credential-forwarding behavior also fires when a victim opens a workspace from a malicious devfile whose `parent.uri` points to an attacker-controlled server, enabling exfiltration of the victim's SCM PAT without direct API access. No fix is available.
https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/CRW-11956
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/620
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/278
Published: 2026-10-05
Updated: 2026-10-06
Base Score: 3.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N
Severity: Low
Base Score: 6.5
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 8.4
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Severity: High
EPSS: 0.00252