Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers. The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login. The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation. Version affected: ≤2.5.45
Published: 2026-09-07
Updated: 2026-09-09
Base Score: 6.4
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 6.1
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 5.1
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Severity: Medium
EPSS: 0.00329