Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise. AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant "default-salt-change-in-production" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82759
https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm
https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541
https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c3a6d5fe0d4fd383ea81b0402db0a96638479478
https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c
Published: 2026-09-17
Updated: 2026-09-18
Base Score: 5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 6.5
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 1.8
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Low
EPSS: 0.00104