Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data. AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82725
https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-7xhg-xphm-f458
https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit/a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15b
Published: 2026-08-31
Updated: 2026-08-31
Base Score: 5.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 4.3
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 2.3
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Low
EPSS: 0.00258