In wolfSSH through 1.5.0 built with --enable-fwd, DoChannelOpen() in src/internal.c gates only direct-tcpip channel opens with the forwarding policy callback. forwarded-tcpip opens are admitted without an authorization check and are not capped in number, allowing a malicious SSH peer to make an endpoint allocate unbounded per-channel buffers for forwarding channels the application never authorized. A client also does not check a forwarded-tcpip open against the forwards it registered with a tcpip-forward request, as RFC 4254 section 7.2 requires, so a malicious server can open forwarding channels for addresses and ports the client never asked it to forward.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/commit/e396a0a4b6b367f10270287446a4be0071742b5c
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/commit/79a7f299337a28aa561409688a268d0efe6e295c
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/commit/616eb681e70759c30c3ba158f2b18d7bd954def8
Published: 2026-10-07
Updated: 2026-10-07
Base Score: 5.8
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 4.3
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 6.3
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Medium
EPSS: 0.00276