Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor. In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81315
https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/security/advisories/GHSA-c92r-f3rr-q49h
https://github.com/ash-project/ash_ai/commit/28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21
Published: 2026-08-31
Updated: 2026-08-31
Base Score: 5.8
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 8.2
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.4
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: High