In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb. The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time. Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5c534b53f8c424a8e7633c9b585475c4bf4ee18
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e25b44bd8b8cc666b49a3fe0ef547e64d5b1e300
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf9d44be50b9074a5abdc301b4a3ba3e283591df
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be311c0cfeadfbe815ea22d2914a98d06e3fab0e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b01f5af0dc59263b59391b148bc78d83c0354a9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9620a91f8d643b680f417a435db399a04d1e06d8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1168484fe2b3828bf24a46f3c42a8719fade679b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04e51353cb9fa321caaeeed8331d4cd041fbaca7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045