In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values() In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these padding bytes are left uninitialized. When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information. Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event. Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset() before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared before the data crosses the security boundary.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e748811d9b80a3e101110ff4b3c612e5fca54d98
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2e3839419ac4047835762c4d7712bda1101b57e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6d5fa46c1ee25d068fc730fd377f0f54188d290
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd3c4108a56de34380edab670065e86283cb3029
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90f305f2c7a30257c683e13f4bf7c798eea992a0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e55ca1080f09d9f7112c7f20ac31f682c1f2374
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d17e9454a9af3ec7aebb88b41a9deedd5b19a6b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06a286b320236508d02ab2ccc9496352748652a8