In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix missing shared-key auth challenge length check The WEP shared-key authentication handler uses the challenge-text element's attacker-controlled length without checking it against the fixed 128-byte chg_txt buffer. In OnAuthClient() the length from rtw_get_ie() - up to 255 - is used to perform memcpy() into the 128-byte pmlmeinfo->chg_txt, so a malicious AP sending a malformed WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE element can overflow/underfill chg_txt by up to 127 bytes. It is reachable over the air, before association, during shared-key authentication. In the case of an overflow, the driver can write out of bounds. In the case of an underfill, the driver can echo stale buffer memory. The challenge text is defined to be exactly 128 octets, which is already provided as the WLAN_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN define; require the element to be exactly that length before use.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a28a4b0592e4a37ea471bc0d308513a93133ce7e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87c2f073d2aaea041d531b8e579c47570b54b3b7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6235b5156b48ed5d1ce3410d8f0b2fd67d30d944
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d018e7d7d908bdfcb5ecfa922b1d5cb9ddb3722
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ba402fd47009d20e51dbfc934abb562098ea35b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39ae1033071001af9bb4573ebdbb43bbbe88f749
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c56ef658ac8c6bca36bc5574715e8f717207c6c