In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio() restore index before retrying In __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-conflict loop, xas_set_order() is applied repeatedly: each application modifies xas.xa_index, rounding it down according to the split_order attempted at that stage: and if all goes as intended, it eventually (or immediately) converges on an xas_try_split() to the required folio_order, with xas.xa_index now the same as index: then xas_store() puts the new folio into the xarray there. But if a new node was needed, and GFP_NOWAIT allocation did not get one, the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() used to allocate, and sequence retried. If (that part of) the xarray is unchanged when the lock is reacquired, no problem. But what if the conflict was meanwhile resolved by another thread (perhaps even doing the same thing, inserting a folio at that same index)? Isn't there a danger of now putting our folio into the xarray at an intermediate rounded-down index? With !folio_contains() bug to follow, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is checking for that. Fix this with an xas_set_order() to restore the original xas.xa_index at the bottom of the loop, so the retry does a full re-evaluation after reacquiring the lock, and cannot reach xas_store() with the wrong index. Production was suffering from rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs, executable text found a page away from where it belonged, !folio_contains() bug hit when debug enabled: symptoms not seen since this patch went in.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio()
    restore index before retrying In __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-conflict loop, xas_set_order() is applied
    repeatedly: each application modifies xas.xa_index, rounding it down according to the split_order
    attempted at that stage: and if all goes as intended, it eventually (or immediately) converges on an
    xas_try_split() to the required folio_order, with xas.xa_index now the same as index: then xas_store()
    puts the new folio into the xarray there. But if a new node was needed, and GFP_NOWAIT allocation did not
    get one, the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() used to allocate, and sequence retried. If (that part of) the
    xarray is unchanged when the lock is reacquired, no problem. But what if the conflict was meanwhile
    resolved by another thread (perhaps even doing the same thing, inserting a folio at that same index)?
    Isn't there a danger of now putting our folio into the xarray at an intermediate rounded-down index? With
    !folio_contains() bug to follow, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is checking for that. Fix this with an
    xas_set_order() to restore the original xas.xa_index at the bottom of the loop, so the retry does a full
    re-evaluation after reacquiring the lock, and cannot reach xas_store() with the wrong index. Production
    was suffering from rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs, executable text found a page away from where it belonged,
    !folio_contains() bug hit when debug enabled: symptoms not seen since this patch went in. (CVE-2026-74591)

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio() restore index before retrying In __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-     conflict loop, xas_set_order() is applied repeatedly: each application modifies xas.xa_index, rounding it     down according to the split_order attempted at that stage: and if all goes as intended, it eventually (or     immediately) converges on an xas_try_split() to the required folio_order, with xas.xa_index now the same     as index: then xas_store() puts the new folio into the xarray there. But if a new node was needed, and     GFP_NOWAIT allocation did not get one, the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() used to allocate, and sequence     retried. If (that part of) the xarray is unchanged when the lock is reacquired, no problem. But what if     the conflict was meanwhile resolved by another thread (perhaps even doing the same thing, inserting a     folio at that same index)? Isn't there a danger of now putting our folio into the xarray at an     intermediate rounded-down index? With !folio_contains() bug to follow, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is checking     for that. Fix this with an xas_set_order() to restore the original xas.xa_index at the bottom of the loop,     so the retry does a full re-evaluation after reacquiring the lock, and cannot reach xas_store() with the     wrong index. Production was suffering from rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs, executable text found a page away     from where it belonged, !folio_contains() bug hit when debug enabled: symptoms not seen since this patch     went in. (CVE-2026-74591)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Type	Severity
471546	Google: sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_18: security update to 20085.0.0	Tenable Cloud Security	Google COS Security Checks	Local	critical
471546	Google: sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_18: security update to 20085.0.0	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	Google COS Security Checks	Local	critical
470800	Google: sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_18: security update to 19999.44.28	Tenable Cloud Security	Google COS Security Checks	Local	critical
470800	Google: sys-kernel/cchost-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/csql-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-kernel-6_18, sys-kernel/lakitu-nc-kernel-6_18: security update to 19999.44.28	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	Google COS Security Checks	Local	critical
351016	Amazon Linux 2023 : bpftool6.18, kernel6.18, kernel6.18-devel (ALAS2023-2026-3139)	Nessus	Amazon Linux Local Security Checks	Local	critical
338966	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-74591	Nessus	Misc.	Local	critical

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CVE-2026-74591

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