In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci: validate codec capability element length Read Local Codec Capabilities returns a sequence of capability elements. Each element starts with a one-byte length followed by that many payload bytes. hci_read_codec_capabilities() checks that the skb contains the length byte, but then validates only caps->len against the remaining skb length. A malformed controller response with one remaining byte and caps->len set to one passes that check even though the element needs two bytes. The parser then records a two-byte capability and copies one byte beyond the advertised response payload into the codec list. Validate the full element size, including the length byte, before adding it to the accumulated capability length. This preserves all well-formed capability elements and drops only truncated controller responses.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc97fc8cf7f53fd3619db63e09050d20a3a0c4b1
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2ad01f55e07f9531efcea736087e6b8658a3440
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec4d352747a62c1082f16c11a74b37d6eb85a5a3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c38fbcdc407925c7088f7e5f11c1fff73d2d35a2
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bc16db0f11918e07edf9fdcda4a30cf4c9df45c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/290b36f9d1eb9b2f72b40d826f26b4a182ab15f7