In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix out-of-bounds firmware read in nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() During the v3 firmware download the controller sends a v3_data_req with a 32 bit offset and a 16 bit len. nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() checks only the lower bound of the offset and then sends firmware from that offset. nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset = offset - nxpdev->fw_v3_offset_correction; serdev_device_write_buf(nxpdev->serdev, nxpdev->fw->data + nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset, len); Nothing checks that fw_dnld_v3_offset + len stays within nxpdev->fw->size, so a controller that asks for an offset or length past the firmware image makes the driver read past the end of nxpdev->fw->data and send that memory back over UART. nxp_recv_fw_req_v1() already bounds the same write. Add the equivalent check to the v3 path, reject the request when it falls outside the firmware image, and zero len on the error path so the fw_v3_prev_sent bookkeeping at free_skb stays consistent.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/badff6c3bed8923a1257a853f137d447976eec30
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49bcb39e3a041ce26021f77971eaccb49a275118
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/441088792ffec3ca01f4efe2934060570eb11eb8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a68a773089204af1c8581dc79668b775418c5ee
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21e60eb4d95854196e7c0e77383f35e7ac95df61