In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3d5e77b27fded71dcb97f409262bf0abba0410e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78150729762d47c14fe29a2582bdca5568e62b8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8301c335305344d4da4ab9442b6a399dacfe5b8d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d2ea15ba03bf17ed143ff1a0995a4206edc3fb6