Wire provides gRPC and protocol buffers for Android, Kotlin, Swift, and Java. Prior to 6.4.5 and 7.0.0-alpha04, Wire protobuf readers do not consistently validate attacker-controlled lengths against the current logical message boundary before advancing cursors, pointers, limits, slices, or allocations. In Kotlin, ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteArray) and ProtoAdapter.decode(ByteString) use ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalNextLengthDelimited(), where a positive oversized length can wrap pos + length to a negative limit and escape the existing negative-length check. Related ProtoReader, ReadBuffer.readVarint(), ReadBuffer.verifyAdditional(count:), packed-repeated, nested-message, and ProtoDecoder.decodeSizeDelimited(_:from:) paths can cross logical boundaries, perform pointer arithmetic, reserve capacity, or convert an unrepresentable size before proving the requested bytes exist. An attacker who supplies malformed protobuf bytes can cause unchecked exceptions, traps, out-of-bounds behavior, or excessive allocation, resulting in denial of service without known confidentiality, integrity, or code-execution impact. This issue is fixed in versions 6.4.5 and 7.0.0-alpha04.
https://github.com/square/wire/security/advisories/GHSA-9rm7-3qhh-h2mc
https://github.com/square/wire/releases/tag/7.0.0-alpha04
https://github.com/square/wire/releases/tag/6.4.5
https://github.com/square/wire/pull/3635
https://github.com/square/wire/commit/25ebcabb9ab7f12d1d77af75ecbc51726fddc015
https://github.com/square/wire/commit/082d5d83cec57ef68f1dd7d3e3d1d641c1fb670f