LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.
https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C/blob/v1.1.6/src/mqtt.c#L1334
https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C
Published: 2026-06-14
Updated: 2026-06-16
Base Score: 8.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:C
Severity: High
Base Score: 8.2
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
Severity: High
Base Score: 8.8
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: High
EPSS: 0.00407