Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53424
https://github.com/handnot2/samly/commit/8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c
https://github.com/dropbox/samly/commit/8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c
Published: 2026-08-20
Updated: 2026-11-20
Base Score: 4.3
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 7.5
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity: High
Base Score: 9.1
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Critical
EPSS: 0.00701