In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc. virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM. If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM, a very large number of packets can be queued because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0. Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size: (Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0)
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bdc637fde66b63d6cad0caacd034888bb7bf5f5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eca304f97a34ed5e921e1f0e06c8b241f25bf12
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/100d5b2ffdc6468b9e48532641f29e83efdcb63c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/059b7dbd20a6f0c539a45ddff1573cb8946685b5