Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0
    and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset
    upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push.
    The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as
    "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI
    on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled
    (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports
    BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend
    (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered.
    No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port —
    local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at
    backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is
    exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation
    (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port
    can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read
    their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version
    1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to
    localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for
    remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during
    those sessions. (CVE-2026-48797)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
444091	SCA: security update for @mcptoolshop/backpropagate, backpropagate (GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	critical
444091	SCA: security update for @mcptoolshop/backpropagate, backpropagate (GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	critical

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-48797

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical