Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-48599
https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/security/advisories/GHSA-mwr4-5g34-j5cq
https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/33b6a095dbc91c6dee3c7b90893d7d74952e82e4
Published: 2026-06-15
Updated: 2026-06-15
Base Score: 5.5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 8.1
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.6
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: High