In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
https://github.com/duck-organization/duck-site/security/advisories/GHSA-qj93-7xrg-rvhw
Published: 2026-06-11
Updated: 2026-06-11
Base Score: 4
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 6.5
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 9.5
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Severity: Critical
EPSS: 0.00043