ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class â€” bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass â€” and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
    Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a
    java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the
    default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf,
    false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class â€” bypassing the
    accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
    readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For
    ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static
    initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the
    allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass )
    causes <clinit> of SomeClass â€” and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both
    issues have been fixed. (CVE-2026-47065)

The remote Ubuntu 22.04 LTS / 24.04 LTS / 26.04 LTS host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the USN-8465-1 advisory.

    It was discovered that Apache MINA lacked an acceptMatchers allowlist mechanism to restrict which classes     could be deserialized. An attacker could use this to execute arbitrary code. This issue only affected     Ubuntu 22.04 LTS and Ubuntu 24.04 LTS. (CVE-2024-52046)

    It was discovered that Apache MINA's deserialization filter could be bypassed via multiple code paths. An     attacker could use this to execute arbitrary code by sending a specially crafted serialized object over     the network. (CVE-2026-42778, CVE-2026-42779, CVE-2026-47065)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Ubuntu security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy     Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a     java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK's ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the     default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf,     false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class  bypassing the     accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in     readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For     ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class's (static     initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the     allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(com.myapp.*) , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass )     causes <clinit> of SomeClass  and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both     issues have been fixed. (CVE-2026-47065)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Type	Severity
462177	Echo: org.apache.mina:mina-core: security update to 2.0.29	Tenable Cloud Security	Echo Local Security Checks	Local	critical
462177	Echo: org.apache.mina:mina-core: security update to 2.0.29	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	Echo Local Security Checks	Local	critical
444856	SCA: security update for org.apache.mina:mina-core (GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	Local	critical
444856	SCA: security update for org.apache.mina:mina-core (GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	Local	critical
322480	Ubuntu 22.04 LTS / 24.04 LTS / 26.04 LTS : Apache MINA vulnerabilities (USN-8465-1)	Nessus	Ubuntu Local Security Checks	Local	critical
318697	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-47065	Nessus	Misc.	Local	critical

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-47065

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical

critical