In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc (9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data. A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes before accessing them.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c411cf1bfde951cfa821809cf4020ba177f76e0c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70d37a8b9229e394cc17ddad47e90b81d80fcd09
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/634a4408c0615c523cf7531790f4f14a422b9206
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/624fb79dadc1b65757986a9d0fdde5c0cf3fe179