On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
https://github.com/Byungju/cve-research-lab
https://github.com/7whyex/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
https://github.com/adriannurrr/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
https://github.com/renewablehacking/CVE-2026-45321-Tanstack
https://github.com/prashanthnataraj/mini-shai-hulud-detector
https://github.com/cataam-security/cataam
https://github.com/nkopylov/tanscript-exploit-check
https://github.com/digi4care/shai-scan
https://github.com/fabriziosalmi/tanstack-compromise-checker
https://github.com/barmi/cve-patch-auditor
https://github.com/Intrudify/mini-shai-hulud-scanner
https://github.com/shayr1/shai-hulud-scan
https://github.com/qi-scape/scan-shai-hulud
https://github.com/Caixa-git/tanstack-shield
https://github.com/Yomisana/are-you-get-tanstack-attack
https://github.com/ry-allan/tanstack-compromise-checker
https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-45321
https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem
https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx