GitLab MCP Server lets an AI agent talk directly to GitLab. Prior to 0.6.0, the HTTP transport in src/transport.ts ships with no authentication layer at all and a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response. The structural defect is that the SSE server stands up a stateful, mutation-capable RPC endpoint that is backed by the operator's GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN without any inbound credential check, then advertises itself to every cross-origin browser context via the wildcard CORS header. The httpServer.listen(port) call at line 97 also passes no host argument, so the bind defaults to 0.0.0.0 and exposes the auth-less surface on every interface. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.0.
https://github.com/yoda-digital/mcp-gitlab-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8jr5-6gvj-rfpf
Published: 2026-05-26
Updated: 2026-05-27
Base Score: 6.4
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 9.1
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity: Critical
Base Score: 9.2
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Critical
EPSS: 0.00016