PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.37, the _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.37.
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-9q28-ghcr-c4x3
Published: 2026-05-08
Updated: 2026-05-08
Base Score: 7.8
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.5
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 8.7
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: High
EPSS: 0.00017