Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component. The camel-hazelcast
    component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java
    deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied
    HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's
    JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over
    the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer
    (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise
    reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on
    every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no
    opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue,
    hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-
    set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected
    whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache
    Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are
    recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases
    stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then
    they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast
    JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes
    and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any
    user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately,
    configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or
    the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and
    enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster. (CVE-2026-43865)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Type	Severity
446362	SCA: security update for org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast (GHSA-xww8-mxqw-m84w)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	Local	high
446362	SCA: security update for org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast (GHSA-xww8-mxqw-m84w)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	Local	high

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-43865

high

Tenable Plugins

high

high