In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane length. The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1dc45d97975f9db65694d234fbddf1915176e16
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d82467c07b03a27c3c5469b62bb3b726305a80bb
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1a0f5f1e5e7e98c36a362ec3d1fcfd9932931ed
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac431d597a9bdfc2ba6b314813f29a6ef2b4a3bf
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d745d38c88ecbed95f6b2b39857bf89f35a3244
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6405e8c680974bb74e2c98d5249fb52c7b12a6c6
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b275bd49e58752efb83767a5d1aed41356c5e64