In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected catalog to have `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that the catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into stored table state. Later table-load and credential APIs can then return temporary cloud-storage credentials for the same location without revalidating it. In plain terms, Polaris can later hand out temporary storage access for the same attacker-chosen area. That attacker-chosen area does not need to be limited to the poisoned table's own files. If it is a broader storage prefix, another table's prefix, or, depending on configuration or provider behavior, even a bucket/container root, the resulting disclosure or corruption scope can extend to any data and metadata Polaris can reach there. The practical consequences are therefore similar to the staged-create credential-vending issue already discussed: data and metadata reachable in that storage scope can be exposed and, if write-capable credentials are later issued, modified, corrupted, or removed. Even before that later credential step, Polaris itself performs the metadata write to the unchecked location. So the core issue is not only later credential vending. The primary defect is that Polaris skips its intended location checks before performing a security- sensitive metadata write when only `write.metadata.path` changes. When `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=false`, current code review suggests the later `updateTableLike(...)` validation usually rejects out-of-tree metadata locations before the unsafe path is persisted. That may reduce the persisted / credential-vending variant, but it does not prevent the underlying defect: Polaris still skips the intended pre-write location check when only `write.metadata.path` changes.

There are packages installed that are affected by a vulnerability referenced in the following CVE:

  - In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong
    to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that
    tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed
    catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level
    `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate
    storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected catalog to have
    `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include
    the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that the
    catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported
    compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who
    can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-
    chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later
    concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into
    stored table state. Later table-load and credential APIs can then return temporary cloud-storage
    credentials for the same location without revalidating it. In plain terms, Polaris can later hand out
    temporary storage access for the same attacker-chosen area. That attacker-chosen area does not need to be
    limited to the poisoned table's own files. If it is a broader storage prefix, another table's prefix, or,
    depending on configuration or provider behavior, even a bucket/container root, the resulting disclosure or
    corruption scope can extend to any data and metadata Polaris can reach there. The practical consequences
    are therefore similar to the staged-create credential-vending issue already discussed: data and metadata
    reachable in that storage scope can be exposed and, if write-capable credentials are later issued,
    modified, corrupted, or removed. Even before that later credential step, Polaris itself performs the
    metadata write to the unchecked location. So the core issue is not only later credential vending. The
    primary defect is that Polaris skips its intended location checks before performing a security- sensitive
    metadata write when only `write.metadata.path` changes. When
    `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=false`, current code review suggests the later
    `updateTableLike(...)` validation usually rejects out-of-tree metadata locations before the unsafe path is
    persisted. That may reduce the persisted / credential-vending variant, but it does not prevent the
    underlying defect: Polaris still skips the intended pre-write location check when only
    `write.metadata.path` changes. (CVE-2026-42812)

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
441549	SCA: security update for org.apache.polaris:polaris-runtime-service (GHSA-w76p-3cgp-qfcm)	Tenable Cloud Security	SCA Checks	critical
441549	SCA: security update for org.apache.polaris:polaris-runtime-service (GHSA-w76p-3cgp-qfcm)	Tenable Self-Hosted Container Security	SCA Checks	critical

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2026-42812

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical