Symlink following vulnerability in Gleam's Hex package export allows files outside the project root to be embedded in the generated package tarball. The file collection helpers (gleam_files, native_files, private_files) in compiler-cli/src/fs.rs use follow_links(true) when walking publishable directories such as src/ and priv/. The collected paths are added to the package archive via add_path_to_tar in compiler-cli/src/publish.rs without verifying that the resolved target remains within the project root. A symlink placed under a publishable directory will cause gleam export hex-tarball or gleam publish to embed the contents of the symlink target into the generated Hex package. An attacker with write access to the project repository can place a symlink in src/ or priv/ pointing to an arbitrary file. When a maintainer or CI pipeline runs gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball, local files readable by the publisher (such as secrets, tokens, or SSH keys) are silently embedded into the published package artifact. This issue affects Gleam from 0.10.0-rc1 until 1.17.0.
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-42795
https://github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/security/advisories/GHSA-qhh5-fg4c-8gqc
https://github.com/gleam-lang/gleam/commit/6435a5528b9ae0449e2f32be579641ec485f6866
Published: 2026-06-02
Updated: 2026-06-02
Base Score: 9.3
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Severity: High
Base Score: 7.1
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Severity: High
Base Score: 5.1
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Severity: Medium