Adminer 4.6.0 before 5.5.0 prepends the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Prefix header to $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] with no trusted-proxy check and no validation of the prefix value. An attacker can supply an absolute URL (e.g. X-Forwarded-Prefix: https://evil.example) that flows into Location redirect headers, the Set-Cookie path attribute, and self-referential links. This enables an authenticated open redirect after state-changing POSTs, unauthenticated control of the session cookie path attribute, and poisoning of self-referential links; CR/LF cannot be injected, so header splitting/XSS is not possible.
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/adminer-before-open-redirect-via-x-forwarded-prefix
https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-8478-xrj3-h9c2
Published: 2026-08-25
Updated: 2026-08-26
Base Score: 5
Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 4.7
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Severity: Medium
Base Score: 5.3
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Severity: Medium
EPSS: 0.00208